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Notes
WELCOME TO ANYTOWN, U.S.A.-HOME OF BEAUTIFUL SCENERY
(AND A CONVICTED SEX OFFENDER):
SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND
NOTIFICATION LAWS IN E.B. v. VERNIERO
.I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most vexing aspects of sexual predation is the high recidi-
vism rate, especially among sex offenders who target and victimize chil-
dren.' In response to recent tragedies highlighting the recidivistic
1. See Robert Teir & Kevin Coy, Approaches to Sexual Predators: Community Notifi-
cation and Civil Commitment, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CraM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 405, 407-
09 (1997) (discussing chronic recidivism problem among sex offenders who target
children). The recidivism of sex offenders has devastating effects on the victims.
See John Briere & Marsha Runtz, Childhood Sexual Abuse: Long-Term Sequelae and
Implications for Psychological Assessment, 8 J. OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 312, 323-24
(1993) (noting that children who are victims of sexual molestation are likely to
develop severe psychosocial problems); Robert E. Freeman-Longo & Fay Honey
Knopp, State-ofthe-Art Sex Offender Treatment: Outcome and Issues, 5 ANNALS OF SEX
RES. 141, 147 (1992) (discussing effects of sex offender recidivism on individual
victims and society). In addition, there is also an economic impact on taxpayers
because of the cost incurred in the investigation of sex crimes and in the convic-
tion, incarceration and treatment of sex offenders. See Freeman-Longo & Knopp,
supra, at 147.
Despite the importance that has been attached to the recidivism problem,
however, there is little agreement in the literature regarding the frequency and
severity of reoffending by sex offenders. See Lita Furby et al., Sex Offender Recidi-
vism: A Review, 105 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 3 (1989) (presenting comprehensive review
of empirical studies of sex offender recidivism). Compare Symposium, Critical Per-
spectives on Megan's Law: Protection vs. Privacy, 13 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTs. 23, 36,
136-37 (1996) (asserting that "statistics have demonstrated that recidivism rates are
extremely high with this type of crime" and that recidivism rates for "[p]edophiles
... are in the ninety percent range"), with R. Karl Hanson et al., Long-Term Recidi-
vism of Child Molesters, 61 J. OF CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 646, 648 (1993)
(finding that 42% of child molesters in study group were reconvicted for sex of-
fense or violent crime), and Marnie E. Rice et al., Sexual Recidivism Among Child
Molesters Released from a Maximum Security Psychiatric Institution, 59 J. OF CONSULTING
& CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 381, 383 (1991) (finding 31% recidivism rate for child mo-
lesters released from maximum security psychiatric institution). Researchers have
conducted extensive research on recidivism rates among sex offenders who target
children. See Teir & Coy, supra, at 408. For example, a study of 453 pedophiles,
funded by the National Institute of Mental Health, reported that each of the
pedophiles in their study molested an average of 52 girls or 150 boys. See id. An-
other study reported that pedophiles victimize an average of 72 children. See id.;
see also Margit C. Henderson & Seth C. Kalichman, Sexually Deviant Behavior and
Schizotypy: A Theoretical Perspective with Supportive Data, 61 PSYCHIATIC Q. 273, 273
(1990). In addition, the results of a recent survey conducted by the United States
Department ofJustice indicate that sex offenders who victimize children are more
than twice as likely to have multiple victims than sex offenders who target adults.
(581)
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tendencies of sex offenders who target children, all fifty states have en-
acted laws requiring persons convicted of certain designated crimes, all of
which involve sexual assault, to register with local law enforcement author-
ities upon release from incarceration. 2 Similarly, in May of 1996, partially
See Teir & Coy, supra, at 407 (citing Brian McGrory, Clinton Sets Tracking of Sex
Offenders, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 25, 1996, at Al). The Justice Department survey
also found that the speed of recidivistic attacks among child molesters is faster
than the recidivistic attacks among sex offenders who target adults. See id. Despite
considerable variation in the recidivism statistics, however, recent commentators
have nevertheless concluded that "recidivism is a serious problem that demands
attention." Id. at 408. In fact, reducing recidivism has been identified as the "most
important goal of legal and therapeutic intervention with sex offenders." Lucy
Berliner et al., A Sentencing Alternative for Sex Offenders: A Study of Decision Making
and Recidivism, 10 J. OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 487, 490 (1995) (discussing sex
offender recidivism and alternative treatments).
2. SeeJames 0. Hacking, II1, Won't You Be My Neighbor?: Do Community Notifica-
tion Statutes Violate Sexual Offenders' Rights Under the Constitution's Ban on the Passage
of Ex Post Facto Laws?, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 761, 761-62 (1997) (discussing sexual
attacks and murders of three New Jersey girls that resulted in public outrage and
action by NewJersey Legislature); Teir & Coy, supra note 1, at 405-06, 408 (discuss-
ing rapes and murders of Polly Klass and Megan Kanka at hands of previously
convicted sex offenders). Richard Allen Davis, the man who raped and murdered
Polly Klass, had eight prior convictions for sexually assaulting and molesting chil-
dren. See id. at 408. Jesse Timmendequas, who confessed to the abduction, rape
and murder of Megan Kanka, was a twice convicted sex offender. See id. Leroy
Hendricks, who recently challenged the Kansas sexual predator statute, committed
sexual crimes against almost a dozen youths. See id. Kevin Aquino, a 17 year-old
who was previously arrested for sexually assaulting three children, recently pleaded
guilty to the kidnapping and murder of six year-old Amanda Wengert. See Hack-
ing, supra, at 761. Finally, Conrad Jeffrey, who was charged with the kidnapping,
rape and murder of seven year-old Divina Genao, was on parole for only six weeks
when the alleged crime occurred. See id.
For a survey of the sex offender statutes enacted in all fifty states, see AA.
CODE § 13A-11-200 (1994); ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.63.010, 18.65.087 (Michie 1996);
ARiz. Rxv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3821, 41-1750(B) (West 1996); Ai. CODE ANN. § 12-
12-901 (Michie 1995); CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997); CoLo.
REv. STAT. § 18-3-4123.5 (1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102r (West 1997);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4120 (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.21 (West 1997); GA.
CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (1997); HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 707-743 (1995); IDAHO CODE§§ 18-8301 to -8311 (1997); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 730-150/1 to 150/10 (West
1995); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 5-2-12-1 to -12 (West 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 692A.1-
.13 (West 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-4902 to -4907 (1996); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 17.510 (Michie 1996); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:540 to :549 (West 1997); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, §§ 11003-11004 (West 1996); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,§ 792 (1996 & Supp. 1997); MASS. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 22, § 37 (West 1994); MICH.
COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 28.721-.730 (West 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.166 (West
1997); Miss. CODE ANN. § 45-33-1 (1997); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.600 (West 1997);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-23-501 to -507 (1995); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 29-4001 to -4013
(1996); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 207.151-.157 (Michie 1997); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 651-B:1 to -B:9 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to :7-5 (West 1995 & Supp.
1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-1 1A-I to -8 (Michie 1996); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168
(McKinney 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-208.5-.13 (1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-
32-15 (1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2950.01-.08 (Anderson 1996); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 57, §§ 581-587 (West 1997); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 181.594-.600 (1996); 42 PA.
CoNs. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-9791 to -9798 (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 11-37-16, -19
(1996); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-3-400 to -490 (Law Co-op. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAws
[Vol. 43: p. 581
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due to the immense publicity that state sex offender registration laws re-
ceived, Congress passed and President Clinton signed a federal sex of-
fender registration law.3
Many states, however, require more than just registration of sex of-
fenders. 4 For example, in response to the abduction, rape and murder of
seven-year-old Megan Kanka by a twice convicted sex offender, NewJersey
became the first state to enact a sex offender notification law. 5 The New
§§ 22-22-39 to -41 (Michie 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-39-101 to -108 (1996);
TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 4413(51) (West 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-
27-21.5 (1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 5401-5413 (1997); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-
298.1-.3, 19.2-390.1 (Michie 1997); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.44130 (West Supp.
1997); W. VA. CODE §§ 61-8F-1 to -10 (1994 & Supp. 1997); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 175.45 (West 1996); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-19-301 to -306 (Michie 1997).
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (1994 & Supp. 1997) (requiring states to establish
systems for notifying communities when convicted sex offenders move into neigh-
borhood after being released from incarceration).
This law, named the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually
Violent Offender Registration Program Act was enacted as part of the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act ("Act") of 1994, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701-
14223 (1994), otherwise known as the 1994 Omnibus Crime Bill. See State v. My-
ers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1028 (Kan. 1996) (discussing federal sex offender registration
law), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2508 (1997); see also Hacking, supra note 2, at 765-73
(discussing NewJersey's Megan's Law and Jacob Wetterling Act); RobertJ. Martin,
Pursuing Public Protection Through Mandatory Community Notification of Convicted Sex
Offenders: The Trials and Tribulations of Megan's Law, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 29, 30
(1996) (noting that NewJersey's Megan's Law served as inspiration for similar leg-
islation adopted by federal government); Tara L. Wayt, Note, Megan's Law: A Viola-
tion of the Right to Privacy, 6 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 139, 156-57 (1997)
(stating that federal government enacted "its own 'Megan's Law'" in May of 1996);
Associated Press, House Passes Federal Version of Megan's Law, BLOOMINGTON HERALD-
TIMES, May 8, 1996, at A3 (reporting that United States House of Representatives
passed federal version of Megan's Law by vote of 418 to 0).
Congress amended the 1994 Act by requiring states to establish systems
whereby communities are notified when a convicted sex offender moves into the
neighborhood. See Wayt, supra, at 157 n.136 (discussing recent amendments to
federal sex offender legislation); see also Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, The Underfederal-
ization of Crime, 6 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'v 247, 300-02 (1997) (discussing federal
sex offender legislation and noting that states must comply with requirements of
law to receive federal funding). Prior to the 1996 amendment, notification was left
to the discretion of the states. See Wayt, supra, at 157 n.136.
4. See John Gibeaut, Defining Punishment, A.B.A. J., March 1997, at 36, 36
(1997) (noting that many states enacted legislation allowing local law enforcement
authorities to notify public of sex offender's presence in community). By March of
1997, all 50 states had enacted sex offender registration laws that generally require
individuals convicted of certain statutorily-specified sex offenses to register with
the local law enforcement authorities. See id. In addition, at least 20 states had
also enacted sex offender notification laws that generally allow local law enforce-
ment authorities to notify the public of a sex offender's presence in the commu-
nity. See id.
5. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to :7-11 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997) (requiring
individuals who commit certain designated crimes involving sexual assault to regis-
ter with local law enforcement authorities and providing for dissemination of in-
formation regarding those required to register). See generally Elga A. Goodman,
Comment, Megan's Law: The New Jersey Supreme Court Navigates Uncharted Waters, 26
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Jersey registration and community notification laws, popularly known as
"Megan's Law," require those who have committed certain designated
crimes involving sexual assault to register with local law enforcement au-
thorities. 6 In addition to the registration requirement, however, Megan's
Law also provides for community notification in varying degrees, with in-
formation about the registrant disseminated to statutorily-designated orga-
nizations and members in the local community.7 Subsequently, a majority
of states followed New Jersey's lead by enacting some form of community
notification program whereby information about the registrant is released
to statutorily-specified entities.8
This recent proliferation of sex offender registration and notification
laws gave rise to numerous state and federal cases challenging the laws on
various constitutional grounds.9 Many of the courts faced with these chal-
SETON HALL L. R v. 764 (1996) (providing discussion of New Jersey's Megan's
Law).
6. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2a to :7-2b (requiring all persons who have "been
convicted, adjudicated delinquent or found not guilty by reason of insanity" for
certain designated crimes involving sexual assault to register with local law enforce-
ment authorities). Although sex offender registration and notification statutes
vary considerably from state to state, both in terms of requirements and scope,
"Megan's Law" has become a generic term for any law providing for the registra-
tion of sex offenders. See Teir & Coy, supra note 1, at 409-13 (discussing various
state sex offender registration and community notification laws and referring to
them generally as "Megan's Laws"). For the remainder of this Note, unless other-
wise specified, the use of the term "Megan's Law" will specifically refer to the New
Jersey legislation.
7. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8c (providing for three levels of community noti-
fication with scope of notification based on designated "tier" classification of
registrant).
8. See People v. Ross, 646 N.Y.S.2d 249, 250 (Sup. Ct. 1996) ("A majority of
states require notification to the community or access by the public to information
on convicted sex offenders."); see also Teir & Coy, supra note 1, at 406 (noting that
some state sex offender statutes provide for public notification to "warn those who
need to know").
9. See, e.g., Artway v. Attorney General, 81 F.3d 1235, 1242 (3d Cir. 1996)
(challenging New Jersey's Megan's Law on various constitutional grounds includ-
ing ex post facto, double jeopardy, bill of attainder, due process, equal protection
and vagueness grounds); Doe v. Gregoire, 960 F. Supp. 1478, 1480 (W.D. Wash.)
(challenging sex offender legislation on ex post facto grounds), affd sub nom. Rus-
sell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 1997); Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603, 604
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (challenging constitutionality of New York state sex offender regis-
tration law on basis of Ex Post Facto Clause of United States Constitution), affd in
part, revd in part, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997); Roe v. Office of Adult Probation,
938 F. Supp. 1080, 1085 (D. Conn. 1996) (challenging sex offender notification
legislation on ex post facto, equal protection, due process and double jeopardy
grounds), vacated, 125 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1997); State v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1027
(Kan. 1996) (challenging Kansas sex offender registration law on ex post facto
grounds), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2508 (1997); Doe v. Criminal History Sys. Bd., No.
Civ.A.96-6046, 1997 WL 100878, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 1997) (challeng-
ing constitutionality of Massachusetts sex offender registration and community no-
tification law on ex post facto, double jeopardy and due process grounds); In re
Registrant C.A., 679 A.2d 1153, 1157 (N.J. 1996) (determining whether various
provisions of New Jersey's Megan's Law offend procedural due process and doc-
[Vol. 43: p. 581
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lenges have reached conflicting conclusions regarding the constitutional-
ity of sex offender registration and notification laws. 10 In one of the latest
challenges, E.B. v. Verniero,1' the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that the community notification provisions of New
trine of fundamental fairness); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 380-81 (N.J. 1995)
(determining whether New Jersey's Megan's Law is constitutional in face of chal-
lenges based on state and federal constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto
laws, bills of attainder, double jeopardy and cruel and unusual punishment); Peo-
ple v. Afrika, 648 N.Y.S.2d 235, 237 (Sup. Ct. 1996) (challenging constitutionality
of application of New York's sexual offender registration law on ex post facto
grounds); Gress v. Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, 924 P.2d 329, 329
(Or. Ct. App. 1996) (challenging classification as "predatory sex offender" under
Oregon's sex offender legislation on ex post facto grounds); Van Doren v.
Mazurkiewicz, 695 A.2d 967, 971 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997) (challenging constitu-
tionality of Pennsylvania sex offender registration law on ex post facto and double
jeopardy grounds).
Recent commentators have noted that sex offender registration and notifica-
tion laws have been challenged on numerous constitutional grounds. See Ronald
K. Chen, Constitutional Challenges to Megan's Law: A Year's Retrospective, 6 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 57, 58-72 (1996) (discussing various constitutional challenges to Megan's
Law); Daniel L. Feldman, The "Scarlet Letter Laws" of the 1990s: A Response to Critics,
60 ALB. L. REv. 1081, 1085 (1997) (noting that sex offender registration and notifi-
cation laws have been challenged on following constitutional grounds: ex post
facto, unreasonable search and seizure of fingerprints and photographs, denial of
equal protection of law, cruel and unusual punishment, double jeopardy, bills of
attainder, invasion of privacy by virtue of government disclosure of certain types of
information to public and violations of procedural due process); Gibeaut, supra
note 4, at 36 ("Sex offender registration laws have survived a barrage of constitu-
tional challenges on grounds ranging from due process and double jeopardy to ex
post facto."); A Survey of Cases Addressing State Statutes Pertaining to the Treatment,
Registration and Community Notification Requirements for Sexual Offenders, 6 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 293, 293, 299, 306, 312, 317, 321, 325, 328 (1996) (providing survey of
cases that have addressed constitutionality of sex offender registration and notifica-
tion laws); Mark J. Swearingen, Comment, Megan's Law as Applied to Juveniles: Pro-
tecting Children at the Expense of Children?, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 525, 532 (1997)
("Concern as to the constitutionality of Megan's Law mounted from the moment
the statute was conceived."); see also Gil Smart, Protecting Whom? In Theory, Megan's
Law Protects Children From Child Molesters. In Practice, Pennsylvania's Law May Not
Achieve That Goal, LANCASTER NEw ERA, Sept. 28, 1997, at Al ("Dozens of sex of-
fenders have sued states over Megan's Law in both federal and state courts.").
Although sex offender registration and notification laws have been challenged
on numerous constitutional grounds, this Note only addresses whether the Tier 2
and-Tier 3 community notification provisions of New Jersey's Megan's Law imper-
missibly inflict punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy
Clauses of the United States Constitution.
10. Compare Artway, 81 F.3d at 1242-43 (upholding constitutionality of New
Jersey's Megan's Law provisions requiring sex offender registration and Tier 1 no-
tification), and Poritz, 662 A.2d at 381 (finding registration provisions of New
Jersey's Megan's Law constitutionally valid), with Roe, 938 F. Supp. at 1091 (deter-
mining that community notification provisions of Connecticut's sex offender noti-
fication policy guidelines constitute punishment in violation of Ex Post Facto
Clause of United States Constitution as applied to defendant), and Myers, 923 P.2d
at 1025-26 (holding that notification requirements of Kansas sex offender registra-
tion law impose "punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United
States Constitution" as applied to defendant).
11. 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1039 (1998).
NOTE
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Jersey's Megan's Law did not inflict "punishment" in violation of the Ex
Post Facto or DoubleJeopardy Clauses of the United States Constitution.1 2
This Note discusses and compares the Third Circuit's holding with
other state and federal court decisions addressing the constitutionality of
sex offender registration and notification laws. 13 Part II summarizes the
history, implementation and operation of New Jersey's Megan's Law, the
constitutional issues associated with the operation of Megan's Law and the
manner in which other courts have treated these constitutional issues.14
Part III describes how the challenge to New Jersey's Megan's Law arose.1 5
Next, Part IV traces the Third Circuit's approach in upholding the consti-
tutionality of the community notification provisions of New Jersey's
Megan's Law.1 6 Part V analyzes the conclusions of law made by the Third
Circuit regarding the constitutionality of Megan's Law.1 7 Finally, Part VI
focuses on the likely impact of the Third Circuit's decision on the commu-
nity notification provisions of Megan's Law and on the relevant areas of
constitutional law.18
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual and Procedural History of Megan's Law
On July 29, 1994, seven-year-old Megan Kanka was abducted, raped
and murdered near her home in New Jersey.1 9 The man who eventually
confessed to, and was convicted of, the rape and murder of Megan Kanka
was a neighbor of the Kanka family and had two prior convictions for sex
offenses involving young girls.20 Megan, her parents, local law enforce-
ment authorities and members of the community, however, were unaware
that the man was a twice-convicted pedophile. 2 1 The rape and murder of
Megan Kanka served to focus public attention on the risks that repeat sex
12. See id. at 1105.
13. For a discussion of the court's decision in E.B., see infra notes 134-206 and
accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the operation of NewJersey's Megan's Law, the ex post
facto and double jeopardy concerns associated with Megan's Law and other court
decisions addressing the constitutionality of sex offender registration and notifica-
tion laws, see infra notes 26-118 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of how the recent challenge to NewJersey's Megan's Law
arose, see infra notes 119-33 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's decision in E.B., see infta notes 134-
206 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the appropriateness of the conclusions of law reached
by the Third Circuit, see infra notes 207-46 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the consequences of the Third Circuit's decision, see
infra notes 247-59 and accompanying text.
19. See E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1081 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 1039 (1998).
20. See id.
21. See id.
[Vol. 43: p. 581
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offenders, especially those who target children, present to the
community. 2
2
22. See Teir & Coy, supra note 1, at 405-06. Recent commentators have noted
that "[i]n response to these murders, committed by repeat sexual offenders, states
have enacted a variety of laws designed to warn communities when convicted sex
offenders move into their neighborhoods." Id. at 406.
Recognizing the risk that repeat sex offenders pose to the community, many
state legislatures have proposed various legislative tools to address the recidivism
problem among sex offenders. See id. at 406-07 (discussing increased prison terms,
civil commitment and castration of sex offenders as legislative alternatives); see also
Note, Prevention Versus Punishment: Toward A Principled Distinction in the Restraint of
Released Sex Offenders, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1711, 1712-15 (1996) [hereinafter Preven-
tion Versus Punishment] (discussing various legislative approaches designed to ad-
dress and reduce recidivism problem among sex offenders). In addition to the
registration and community notification requirements found in various versions of
Megan's Law, one approach is mandating longer prison terms through legislation
that is specifically directed at repeat sex offenders. See Teir & Coy, supra note 1, at
406. Although this approach would probably be effective at keeping dangerous
sex offenders off the street, some states may be reluctant to financially support the
warehousing of these individuals in state penal facilities. See id.
As an alternative to mandating longer prison terms, Kansas and a handful of
other states are employing post sentence, involuntary civil commitment as a way to
keep "sexually violent predators" off the street. See id. at 407. For example, the
Kansas sexually violent predator law established procedures for the post sentence,
involuntary civil commitment of persons who, due to a "mental abnormality" or a
"personality disorder," are likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence. See
id. at 416-17; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a17 (1995) (providing for
post sentence, involuntary civil commitment of sexually violent predators). The
Kansas law protects the public from convicted sex offenders, but avoids the "ware-
housing" of numerous prisoners in state and federal correctional facilities. SeeTeir
& Coy, supra note 1, at 407 (noting that approach employed by state of Kansas
"provide[s] a tough, but realistic, answer to the serious problem of recidivism
presented by sexual offenders"). The constitutionality of the Kansas law was re-
cently challenged in Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997). The Supreme
Court of the United States held that the law comports with due process require-
ments and does not violate the Ex Post Facto or Double Jeopardy Clauses of the
United States Constitution. See id. at 2086; see also Eric S. Janus, The Use of Social
Science and Medicine in Sex Offender Commitment, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CIM. & Civ.
CONFINEMENT 347 (1997) (discussing use of psychological and psychiatric research
to address ex post facto concerns raised by post sentence, involuntary civil commit-
ment of sexually violent predators); Deborah L. Morris, Note, Constitutional Implica-
tions of the Involuntary Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators-A Due Process Analysis,
82 CORNELL L. REv. 594, 624-37 (1997) (addressing constitutional concerns associ-
ated with post sentence, involuntary civil commitment of sexually violent
predators).
Two recent trends in sex offender legislation, also designed to address the risk
that repeat sex offenders pose to the community, are chemical castration and DNA
testing. See Robert E. Freeman-Longo, Reducing Sexual Abuse in America: Legislating
Tougher Laws or Public Education and Prevention, 23 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 303, 311-17 (1997) (discussing various legislative tools, including
chemical and surgical castration, designed to reduce recidivism risk among repeat
sexual offenders); Prevention Versus Punishment, supra, at 1713-14 (discussing use of
DNA testing as means to gather information about sex offenders). The chemical
castration laws mandate that convicted sex offenders undergo hormone treatment
that is designed to dramatically reduce their sex drive. See Freeman-Longo, supra,
at 314 (noting that most commonly used drug is Depo-Provera, which lowers blood
7
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By August 15, 1994, just two weeks after the murder of Megan Kanka,
bills providing for sex offender registration and community notification
were introduced into New Jersey's General Assembly.23 Two weeks later,
the bills were declared emergency measures, thereby allowing them to by-
pass the often lengthy committee process.2 4 By October 31, 1994, as a
result of determined campaigning by Megan's parents and the public out-
cry that followed Megan's brutal rape and murder, New Jersey enacted
registration and community notification laws as part of a ten bill package
collectively referred to as "Megan's Law."25
B. Megan's Law Statutory Scheme: Registration and Notification
The fundamental premise of Megan's Law is that registration and
carefully tailored notification will prevent sex offenders from reoffending
by alerting law enforcement authorities and those members of the com-
munity likely to encounter a sex offender to the potential danger posed by
serum testosterone levels in males). The first chemical castration law was passed in
1996 by the California Legislature and since that time, at least seven other states
have considered similar legislation. See id. (noting that Colorado, Florida, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Montana, Texas and Washington are considering similar legis-
lation). Several other states, such as Connecticut, Oregon and Virginia, also
require convicted sex offenders to provide blood samples that are "subsequently
DNA tested, screened, and filed in the state's criminal justice data bank." Preven-
tion Versus Punishment, supra, at 1713 & n.21. The theory behind DNA testing is
that "'investigations of murders and sexual offenses are ... likely to yield the type
of evidence from which DNA information can be derived."' Id. at 1713-14 (quot-
ing Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1561 (9th Cir. 1995)). These "DNA fingerprint-
ing laws purportedly aid in the identification, apprehension, and prosecution of
repeat sex predators." Id. at 1714.
23. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1081 (noting that public reaction to Megan Kanka's
murder was intense and that NewJersey's governor, Christine Todd Whitman, and
legislature responded quickly); see also Kirsten R. Bredlie, Comment, Keeping Chil-
dren Out of Double Jeopardy: An Assessment of Punishment and Megan's Law in Doe v.
Poritz, 81 MINN. L. REV. 501, 501 (1996) (noting that NewJersey Legislature passed
Megan's Law in response to public pressure and reports indicating that repeat
offenders pose extreme danger to public safety).
24. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1081-82 (tracing procedural history of Megan's Law
through NewJersey Legislature); see also Artway v. Attorney General, 81 F.3d 1235,
1243 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that proposed legislation was only debated on floor of
General Assembly, with no member voting against it); Robin L. Deems, Comment,
California's Sex Offender Notification Statute: A Constitutional Analysis, 33 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1195, 1200 (1996) (noting that NewJersey Senate passed Megan's Law "'with
only token debate"' and New Jersey Assembly scheduled vote on five of ten bills
"'without customary committee hearing"' (quotingJerry Gray, Sex Offender Legisla-
tion Passes in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1994, at B6)); Hacking, supra note 2, at
806 (discussing fact that Megan's Law was "passed in record time and under very
unusual circumstances").
25. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 to :7-11 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997) (providing
for registration of sex offenders and subsequent community notification); see also
Artway, 81 F.3d at 1243-44 (describing factual and procedural history leading to
legislative enactment of Megan's Law); Freeman-Longo, supra note 22, at 313 (dis-
cussing factual origins of sex offender registration and notification legislation).
588 [Vol. 43: p. 581
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repeat sex offenders. 26 Specifically, the stated legislative purpose of
Megan's Law is to identify potential recidivists, alert the public when nec-
essary for public safety and help prevent and promptly resolve incidents
involving sexual abuse and missing persons. 27 To accomplish these goals,
Megan's Law provides for both mandatory registration and a three tier
notification system.28 The Megan's Law registration provisions require all
persons who have completed a sentence for certain statutorily-designated
sex crimes after the enactment of Megan's Law to register with local law
enforcement authorities. 29 The registrant is required to provide the fol-
lowing information to the chief law enforcement officer of the municipal-
ity in which the registrant resides: name, social security number, age, race,
sex, date of birth, height, weight, hair and eye color, address of legal resi-
dence, address of any current temporary legal residence and date and
place of employment.30 After registration is completed and the registra-
tion agency forwards the registrant's information to the prosecutor of the
26. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1098 (citing Artway, 81 F.3d at 1265).
27. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1. Section 2C:7-1 provides:
The legislature finds and declares:
a. The danger of recidivism posed by sex offenders and offenders who
commit other predatory acts against children, and the dangers posed by
persons who prey on others as a result of mental illness, require a system
of registration that will permit .law enforcement officials to identify and
alert the public when necessary for the public safety.
b. A system of registration of sex offenders and offenders who commit
other predatory acts against children will provide law enforcement with
additional information critical to preventing and promptly resolving inci-
dents involving sexual abuse and missing persons.
Id.
28. See id. §§ 2C:7-2 to :7-11 (outlining registration and notification provisions
of Megan's Law); see also E.B., 119 F.3d at 1082-84 (discussing registration and
subsequent notification required under Megan's Law); Artway, 81 F.3d at 1243-44
(same).
29. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2b(1) (defining relevant terms and establishing
registration requirements for sex offenders). The relevant statutory provision
provides:
b. For the purposes of this act a sex offense shall include the following:
(1) Aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual
contact, kidnapping... or an attempt to commit any of these crimes if
the court found that the offender's conduct was characterized by a pat-
tern of repetitive, compulsive behavior, regardless of the date of the
commission of the offense or the date of conviction ....
Id.
30. See id. § 2C:7-4b(1) (stating that registrant must provide information in
written statement signed by registrant acknowledging that registrant was advised of
duty to register and reregister imposed by Megan's Law). The relevant statutory
provision provides:
b. The form of registration required by this act shall include:
(1) A statement in writing signed by the person required to register
acknowledging that the person has been advised of the duty to register
and reregister imposed by this act and including the person's name,
social security number, age, race, sex, date of birth, height, weight, hair
and eye color, address of legal residence, address of any current tempo-
rary residence, date and place of employment ....
1998] NOTE
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county where the registrant was prosecuted, the information is forwarded
to the Division of State Police where it is incorporated into a central regis-
try.3 ' As a final step, the registrant's information is provided to the prose-
cutor of the county in which the registrant plans to reside.3 2 Megan's Law
penalizes noncompliance by providing that any person subject to the regis-
tration requirements who fails to register is guilty of a fourth degree
crime.3 3 The registration requirement continues for fifteen years from
the date of conviction or release, whichever is later.3 4 Once this fifteen
year period lapses, a registrant may apply to the Superior Court of New
Jersey to terminate his or her obligation to register.
35
The information obtained during the registration phase of Megan's
Law is used as the basis for the next step-notification. 36 The prosecutor
of the county where the registrant plans to reside and the prosecutor from
the convicting county use the registration information to jointly assess the
risk of reoffense posed by the registrant.3 7 Together, they determine
whether the registered sex offender poses a low (Tier 1), moderate (Tier
2) or high (Tier 3) risk of reoffense. 38 The designated tier classification
determines the scope of the subsequent notification, with Tier 1 having
the smallest scope and Tier 3 having the largest scope.39 The Attorney
Id. In addition, the registrants are required to confirm their permanent address
every 90 days, notify the municipal law enforcement agency if they move and rere-
gister with the law enforcement agency of any new municipality. See id. § 2C:7-2d
to :7-2e.
31. See id. § 2C:7-4c to :7-4d (describing responsibilities of county prosecutors
and administrative procedures for forwarding of registrant's information).
32. See id. § 2C:7-4c (discussing procedures for forwarding of registrant's in-
formation to prosecutor of county in which registrant plans to reside).
33. See id. § 2C:7-2a.
34. See id. § 2C:7-2f.
35. See id. The registration obligation will only be terminated upon proof that
the registrant did not commit an offense within 15 years following conviction or
release from a correctional facility, whichever is later. See id. In addition, the obli-
gation will only be terminated "upon a persuasive showing that the registrant is not
likely to pose a threat to the safety of others." E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1083
(3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1039 (1998).
36. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1083-84 (describing use of registration information in
subsequent notification process).
37. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8d(1) (listing individuals who are responsible
for determining registrant's degree of risk of reoffense). The statute provides, in
relevant part:
(1) The county prosecutor of the county where the person was convicted
and the county prosecutor of the county where the registered person will
reside, together with any law enforcement officials that either deems ap-
propriate, shall assess the risk of re-offense by the registered person;
(2) The county prosecutor of the county in which the registered person
will reside, after consultation with local law enforcement officials, shall
determine the means of providing notification.
Id. § 2C:7-8d(1), (2).
38. See id. § 2C:7-8c ("The regulations shall provide for three levels of notifica-
tion depending upon the risk of re-offense by the offender .... ").
39. See id. § 2C:7-8c(1)-(3). Specifically, the statute provides:
590
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General of New Jersey, pursuant to the statutory requirements of Megan's
Law, developed guidelines to assist authorities in the classification of sex
offenders.4" The Supreme Court of NewJersey, however, has slightly mod-
(1) If the risk of re-offense is low, law enforcement agencies likely to en-
counter the person registered shall be notified;
(2) If the risk of re-offense is moderate, organizations in the community
including schools, religious and youth organizations shall be notified...
in addition to the notice required by paragraph (1) of this subsection;
(3) If the risk of re-offense is high, the public shall be notified through
means .. .designed to reach members of the public likely to encounter
the person registered, in addition to the notice required by paragraphs
(1) and (2) of this subsection.
Id. Tier 1 notification, which is also known as "law enforcement alert," is required
for every registrant. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1083. Tier 2 notification, also known as
"law enforcement, school and community organization alert," provides notification
to the following entities: registered schools, day care centers, summer camps and
community organizations that care for children or provide support to women. See
id. Tier 3 notification, also known as "community notification," extends to mem-
bers of the public likely to encounter the registered sex offender. See id.
To promote and preserve uniformity and consistency in the classification and
notification process, Megan's Law requires the state Attorney General to develop
and promulgate guidelines to be used by the county prosecutors when assessing
the registrant's degree of risk of reoffense. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8a to :7-8d.
The guidelines are required to include consideration of the following factors:
(1) Conditions of release that minimize risk of re-offense, including but
not limited to whether the offender is under supervision of probation or
parole; receiving counseling, therapy or treatment; or residing in a home
situation that provides guidance and supervision;
(2) Physical conditions that minimize risk of re-offense, including but
not limited to advanced age or debilitating illness;
(3) Criminal history factors indicative of high risk of re-offense,
including:
(a) Whether the offender's conduct was found to be characterized by
repetitive and compulsive behavior;
(b) Whether the offender served the maximum term;
(c) Whether the offender committed the sex offense against a child;
(4) Other criminal history factors to be considered in determining risk,
including:
(a) The relationship between the offender and the victim;
(b) Whether the offense involved the use of a weapon, violence, or
infliction of serious bodily injury;
(c) The number, date and nature of prior offenses;
(5) Whether psychological or psychiatric profiles indicate a risk of
recidivism;
(6) The offender's response to treatment;
(7) Recent behavior, including behavior while confined or while under
supervision in the community as well as behavior in the community fol-
lowing service of sentence; and
(8) Recent threats against persons or expressions of intent to commit
additional crimes.
Id. § 2C:7-8b(1)-(8).
40. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1083. The "Registrant Risk Assessment Scale" consists
of a matrix with 13 factors divided into four broad categories. See id. at 1084. The
specific factors and their organization can be summarized as follows:
Seriousness of Offense:
1) degree of force
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ified and revised the substantive and procedural aspects of the legislative
scheme discussed above.
41
2) degree of contact
3) age of victim
Offense History:
4) victim selection
5) number of offenses/victims
6) duration of offense
7) length of time since last offense
8) history of antisocial acts
Characteristics of Offender:
9) response to treatment
10) substance abuse
Community Support:
11) therapeutic support
12) residential support
13) employment/educational stability.
Id. at 1084 n.2. The prosecutors determine whether the registrant poses a low,
moderate or high risk to the community based on the 13 factors and then assign
zero, one or three points, respectively, for each factor. See id. at 1084. The prose-
cutors then multiply the raw scores under "Seriousness of Offense" by five, the
factors under "Offense History" by three, the factors under "Characteristics of Of-
fender" by two and the factors under "Community Support" by one. See id. The
points are totaled and the registrant is placed into the appropriate classification
tier: Tier 1 (low risk): 0 to 36 points; Tier 2 (moderate risk): 37 to 73 points; and
Tier 3 (high risk): 74 to 111 points. See id. As a final step, the prosecutors consider
the applicability of two exceptions. See id. First, if the offender indicates that he or
she will reoffend if released back into the community, he or she will be deemed to
be a high risk of reoffense regardless of the scale score. See id. Second, if the
offender has a physical condition that minimizes the risk of reoffense, he or she
will be deemed to be a low risk of reoffense regardless of the scale score. See id.
Predicting dangerous behavior, or "risk assessment," has recently received a
great deal of attention. See Kirk Heilbrun, Prediction Versus Management Models Rele-
vant to Risk Assessment: The Importance of Legal Decision-Making Context, 21 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 347, 348 (1997) (discussing importance of risk assessment to society and
significant research advances made within area during last decade); Randy K. Otto,
On the Ability of Mental Health Professionals to "Predict Dangerousness ": A Commentary on
Interpretations of the "Dangerousness" Literature, 18 L. & PSVCHOL. REv. 43, 43 (1994)
(discussing increasing use of risk assessment and problems associated with predic-
tion of violent behavior). A recent commentator noted that predicting whether an
individual will engage in violent or dangerous behavior is increasingly becoming a
function of the judiciary and other decision-making bodies. See id. at 44-45, 67
(noting that courts and other decision-making bodies engage in predictions of
behavior). Despite 25 years of research, however, those engaged in the practice of
predicting violent or dangerous behavior "have barely scratched the surface of [us-
ing] risk assessment as a predictive tool." Id. at 67-68.
41. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1085-87 (discussing recent decisions by Supreme
Court of NewJersey that have helped to refine and shape Megan's Law); see also In
re Registrant G.B., 685 A.2d 1252, 1264 (N.J. 1996) (recognizing that registrant is
entitled to lodge three distinct challenges to tier designation); In re Registrant
C.A., 679 A.2d 1153, 1164 (N.J. 1996) (determining that registrant's hearing is
"civil, not criminal, and remedial, not adversarial"); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367,
381-82 (N.J. 1995) (upholding constitutionality of Megan's Law and reading into
statute certain procedures designed to prevent any "excessiveness of community
notification"); Herbert B. Kaplan, Is This What They Mean by Sex Education?: Keep-
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ing Sex Offenders Out of the Schools, 8 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 51, 63-73 (1996)
(discussing constitutional challenges to Megan's Law in Artway v. Attorney General).
Three recent decisions by the Supreme Court of New Jersey have shaped and
refined the Megan's Law statutory scheme. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1085-87 (discuss-
ingjudicial refinement of Megan's Law by Supreme Court of NewJersey). In Doe
v. Poritz, the Supreme Court of NewJersey upheld the constitutionality of Megan's
Law, while at the same time reading additional procedural protections into the
statute. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 381. There were three noteworthy aspects in the Poritz
court's decision. See id. at 381-82. First, the court held that when a prosecutor
classifies a registrant in Tier 2, the prosecutor must make an individual determina-
tion, on a case-by-case basis, regarding the appropriate institutions and organiza-
tions to include in the subsequently developed notification program. See id. at 382,
385. Second, the court added a requirement to the Megan's Law scheme whereby
county prosecutors are required to provide registrants with written notice if they
are classified in either Tier 2 or Tier 3. See id. at 382. In addition, prosecutors
must also provide registrants with notice of the proposed notification plan. See id.
The court recognized, however, that in some cases it may be impossible to provide
notice or to do so in a timely manner and, in those cases, written notice would not
need to be provided. See id. Finally, the Poritz court held that the state is required
to make a prenotification judicial hearing available to registrants who wish to chal-
lenge either their tier classification or the proposed notification plan. See id. In
these proceedings, the court decides only whether to affirm or reverse the prosecu-
tor's determinations and thus, the registrant bears the burden of persuasion. See
id. The court will only reverse the prosecutor's determinations if the registrant
persuades the court by a preponderance of the evidence that the prosecutor's de-
terminations do not adhere to the statutory requirements. See E.B., 119 F.3d at
1086 (discussing role of court in pre-notification judicial review process); see also In
re Registrant A.I., 696 A.2d 77, 79 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (challenging
high risk sex offender designation under New Jersey's Megan's Law).
While the Poritz court was mostly concerned with the procedural aspects of
Megan's Law, the Supreme Court of New Jersey also addressed the three bases
upon which registrants can challenge their tier classification. See G.B., 685 A.2d at
1264 (discussing bases on which registrants may challenge their tier classification).
First, a registrant may present evidence showing that the calculation leading to the
Registrant Risk Assessment Scale score was incorrectly performed because: (1)
there was a factual error; (2) there was a dispute cohcerning a prior offense com-
mitted by the registrant; or (3) the variable factors were improperly determined.
See id. Second, a registrant may introduce evidence that the scale calculations do
not adequately encompass his or her specific case and, due to unique circum-
stances, the tier classification is not appropriate. See id. Third and finally, a regis-
trant may introduce evidence demonstrating that the notification required by the
tier classification is excessive because of unique aspects of his or her case. See id.
The G.B. court also recognized a limitation on the challenges that a registrant
may make. See id. Specifically, the court noted that a registrant may not challenge
the scale itself or the weight afforded to any of the individual factors that comprise
the scale. See id. Instead, all challenges must be based on the characteristics of the
individual registrant and the inadequacies of the scale in his or her particular case.
See id.
Finally, the Supreme Court of New Jersey addressed the nature of a regis-
trant's hearing under Megan's Law in In re Registrant C.A., 679 A.2d at 1164. The
court noted that the rules of evidence do not apply in a Megan's Law hearing. See
id. In addition, the court recognized that the hearing is substantially similar to an
evidentiary or investigative hearing. See id. Accordingly, the court concluded that
a registrant's hearing under Megan's Law "is civil, not criminal, and remedial, not
adversarial." Id. Based on these considerations, the court adopted the format
used in probation violation hearings as the appropriate format for Megan's Law
notification hearings. See id. at 1166.
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C. Constitutionality of Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws
The enactment of sex offender registration and notification laws has
led to numerous challenges to the constitutionality of these laws. 4 2
Megan's Law, however, has primarily been challenged on two constitu-
tional grounds: ex post facto and double jeopardy.43 When addressing
these issues, federal and state courts have reached quite different results
regarding the constitutionality of these laws. 44 Before exploring cases that
address such constitutional challenges to sex offender registration and no-
tification laws, it is first necessary to consider the evolution of the Ex Post
Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses in the jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court.
45
1. Ex Post Factb Clause
The United States Constitution provides that "[n] o State shall ... pass
any ... ex post facto []]aw. ' '46 The Supreme Court of the United States
first interpreted the range and scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause in Calder
v. Bull 4 7 In Calder, Justice Chase noted four types of laws that the Ex Post
Facto Clause expressly prohibits and, by doing so, established the appro-
priate scope of the Clause. 48 First, the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits any
law that punishes a previously-committed act as a crime if the act was not a
42. For a discussion of state and federal cases in which sex offender registra-
tion and notification laws have been challenged on various constitutional grounds,
see supra note 9.
43. For a discussion of the cases in which Megan's Law has been challenged
on ex post facto and double jeopardy grounds, see infra notes 71-118 and accom-
panying text.
44. For a discussion of recent state and federal decisions in which courts have
reached conflicting conclusions regarding the constitutionality of sex offender re-
gistration and notification laws, see supra note 10.
45. For a discussion of Supreme Court cases that have addressed challenges
based on the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses, see infra notes 46-70 and
accompanying text.
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Article I, Section 9 of the United States
Constitution also provides, in relevant part: "No ... ex post facto Law shall be
passed." Id. at art. I, § 9, cl. 3. The fundamental role of the prohibition against ex
post facto laws found in the United States Constitution was summarized by James
Madison as follows:
Bills of Attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of
contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to
every principle of sound legislation. The two former are expressly prohib-
ited by the declarations prefixed to some of the State Constitutions, and
all of them are prohibited by the spirit and scope of these fundamental
charters. Our own experience has taught us nevertheless, that additional
fences against these dangers ought not to be omitted. Very properly
therefore have the Convention added this constitutional bulwark in favor
of personal security and private rights.
THE FEDERALisT No. 44, at 301 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
47. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
48. See id. at 390.
[Vol. 43: p. 581
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crime when committed. 49 Second, any law that aggravates a crime, or
makes it more serious than it was when committed, is prohibited by the Ex
Post Facto Clause.50 Third, the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits the retroac-
tive application of a law that inflicts a greater punishment for the crime
than the law originally provided at the time the crime was committed. 51
Fourth and finally, the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits every law that alters
the legal rules of evidence that existed at the time the crime was
committed. 5
2
A review of various Supreme Court decisions in which the Court ap-
plied the Ex Post Facto Clause reveals that the Clause serves two funda-
mental purposes. 53 First, the Ex Post Facto Clause is designed to ensure
that legislative acts provide fair warning of their effect, thereby allowing
individuals to rely on the currently accepted meaning of the act until it is
explicitly changed by the legislature. 54 Second, the Ex Post Facto Clause
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id. This third prohibition provides the constitutional basis on which
sex offender registration and notification laws are most often challenged. See, e.g.,
E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1081, 1092 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that E.B. chal-
lenged Megan's Law on ex post facto grounds, alleging that it inflicts greater pun-
ishment than law annexed to crime when crime was committed), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 1039 (1998).
52. See Calder, 3 U.S. at 390. The four categories of laws prohibited by the Ex
Post Facto Clause, as first articulated by Justice Chase in Calder, were eventually
rephrased by the Supreme Court in the following manner:
[A]ny statute which punishes as a crime an act previously committed,
which was innocent when done, which makes more burdensome the pun-
ishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged
with a crime of any defense available according to law at the time when
the act was committed, is prohibited as ex post facto.
Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70 (1925).
This interpretation of the range and scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause has
remained relatively constant since first being articulated in Calder and it has been
reaffirmed repeatedly by the Supreme Court. See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S.
37, 41-43 (1990) (reaffirming definition of Ex Post Facto Clause first articulated in
Calder); Beazell, 269 U.S. at 169-70 (same); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87,
138 (1810) (same). Specifically, in Collins, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the
Ex Post Facto Clause incorporated a "term of art with an established meaning at
the time of the framing of the Constitution." Collins, 497 U.S. at 41.
53. See Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 429-30 (1987) (discussing two tradition-
ally-recognized purposes of Ex Post Facto Clause); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24,
28-29 (1981) (same). In addition to the Supreme Court, other federal courts have
discussed the purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause. See United States v. Meeks, 25
F.3d 1117, 1118-19 (2d Cir. 1994) (discussing Ex Post Facto Clause and purposes it
serves); Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997); Roe v. Office of Adult Probation, 938 F.
Supp. 1080, 1087 (D. Conn. 1996) (same), vacated, 125 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1997).
54. See Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 613 (stating that it is "fundamentally fair for
people to know the law before they act"); see also Roe, 938 F. Supp. at 1087 (stating
that one traditionally-accepted purpose of Ex Post Facto Clause is to provide notice
of legislation's effect).
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"prevent[s] legislative abuses by curbing the 'enact[ment of] arbitrary or
vindictive legislation"' on individuals or classes of individuals. 5 5
The constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws, however,
only applies to penal statutes which have the effect of disadvantaging the
offender subject to the laws. 56 Accordingly, in an effort to promote uni-
formity in this area of constitutional law, the Supreme Court in DeVeau v.
Braisted5 7 established the test that must be applied when a party alleges
that a legislative act violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.58 Specifically, the
Court stated that the hallmark of an ex post facto law is the imposition of
punishment for previously-committed acts. 59 Thus, the Court held that
55. Roe, 938 F. Supp. at 1087 (quoting Meeks, 25 F.3d at 1118-19); see also
Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 613 (discussing inherent unfairness of ex post facto
legislation).
56. See State v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1030 (Kan. 1996) (discussing application
of constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2508
(1997); see also Beazel, 269 U.S. at 169-70 (noting that "ex post facto" is term of art
applicable only to punishment);Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equi-
librium Approach, I10 HARv. L. REv. 1055, 1074 (1997) ("Even the Ex Post Facto
Clause, with its explicit prohibition on retroactivity, applies only in the criminal
context."); Gregory Y. Porter, Note, Uncivil Punishment: The Supreme Court's Ongoing
Struggle with Constitutional Limits on Punitive Civil Sanctions, 70 S. CAL. L. Rv. 517,
545-46 (1997) (noting that Ex Post Facto Clause only applies in criminal context).
One commentator has noted, however, that the Ex Post Facto Clause could also
apply in "quasi-criminal" contexts. See id. at 546. According to this commentator,
almost all of the courts that addressed the issue have indicated that if civil sanc-
tions are determined to be quasi-criminal in nature, the prohibitions found in the
Ex Post Facto Clause would apply. See id.
57. 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
58. See id. at 160. In DeVeau, the Supreme Court was faced with a challenge to
the constitutional validity of section 8 of the New York Waterfront Commission Act
of 1953. See id. at 144-45. The New York act, which formulated a detailed scheme
for governmental supervision of employment on the waterfront in the Port of New
York, was challenged as being in violation of various constitutional provisions, in-
cluding the Ex Post Facto Clause. See id. at 145. The act was enacted to combat the
"corruption" and "dishonesties" perpetrated by many officials in the Port of New
York. See id. at 147. The challenged provision of the act, section 8, generally pro-
vided that no person shall solicit or receive any dues on behalf of any waterfront
union if any officer of such union has been convicted of a felony. See id. at 145.
The appellant, an officer of waterfront union Local 1346, had previously pleaded
guilty to a charge of grand larceny in 1920 and, as a result of the operation of
section 8, was suspended from the union. See id. at 145-46. Upon being sus-
pended, the appellant brought an action challenging the constitutional validity of
section 8 of the act. See id. at 146. Specifically, the appellant claimed that section 8
was imposing punishment for a past act in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of
the United States Constitution. See id. at 145. After the lower court sustained the
validity of the challenged section and an appellate court affirmed the lower court's
judgment, appellant sought review in the Supreme Court of the United States. See
id. at 146. In upholding the constitutionality of the act, the Court noted that the
legislative aim behind the act was not to "punish" ex-felons, but to devise a neces-
sary plan for regulation of the waterfront. See id. at 160. Therefore, because the
challenged provision did not impose punishment for a past act, it did not violate
the Ex Post Facto Clause. See id.
59. See id.
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the relevant inquiry is whether the legislative goal is to punish the individ-
ual for past conduct or whether the negative consequences are merely in-
cidental.60 Therefore, when examining challenged legislation, the court
must determine whether the legislation impermissibly imposes "punish-
ment" in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 61
2. Double Jeopardy Clause
In addition to challenges based on the Ex Post Facto Clause, sex of-
fender registration and notification laws are also challenged on double
jeopardy grounds. 62 The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution prohibits "'successive punishments
and ... successive prosecutions." 63 It protects against three separate and
distinct abuses: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquit-
tal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and
(3) multiple punishments for the same offense. 64
60. See id. The court noted that if the negative consequences are merely inci-
dental, the challenged law or clause will be declared valid. See id.
61. See E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1092 (3d Cir. 1997) ("[T]he critical
issue . .. is whether the notification called for in situations involving Tier 2 and
Tier 3 registrants is 'punishment' for purposes of the Ex Post Facto [Clause]
.... ), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1039 (1998).
62. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be ... subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . ."). The Fifth Amendment
has been made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
63. United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2139 (1996) (alterations in origi-
nal) (quoting United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993)).
64. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989) (discussing Supreme
Court's interpretation of purposes and functions of Double Jeopardy Clause in
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)); see also Smalis v. Pennsylvania,
476 U.S. 140, 145-46 (1986) (recognizing that Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits
retrial of criminal charges after acquittal); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600,
611 (1976) (recognizing that Double Jeopardy Clause can preclude retrial after
prosecutorial misconduct causes mistrial).
The third protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause, the prohibition
against multiple punishments for the same offense, provides the constitutional ba-
sis on which sex offender registration and notification laws are most often chal-
lenged. See, e.g., E.B., 119 F.3d at 1081, 1092 (noting that E.B. challenged Megan's
Law on double jeopardy grounds, alleging that it inflicts multiple punishments for
same offense). The protection against multiple punishments for the same offense
is deeply rooted in the history and jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, first being
recognized in 1873 when the Court observed that "no man can be twice lawfully
punished" for the same offense. Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168
(1873). James Madison, in drafting the initial version of what subsequently be-
came the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution, primarily fo-
cused on the issue of multiple punishments for the same offense: "No person shall
be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more than one punishment or one
trial for the same offense." 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 434 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
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In United States v. Ursery65 and Kansas v. Hendricks,66 arguably the most
important authorities in evaluating legislation under the Double Jeopardy
Clause, the Supreme Court established guidelines for determining
whether legislation impermissibly imposes a second punishment in viola-
tion of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 6 7 The court should examine the leg-
islature's intent and determine whether the legislature intended the
legislation to be a remedial civil sanction or a criminal penalty.68 If the
court determines that the legislature intended the legislation to be a crimi-
nal penalty, the legislation will be prohibited as inflicting a second punish-
ment in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 69 Conversely, if the
court determines that the legislature's intent was remedial, the court must
then determine whether the statutory scheme is so punitive, either in pur-
pose or effect, that it results in a negation of the legislature's remedial
intent, thereby violating the Double Jeopardy Clause.70
3. Constitutional Challenges to Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Laws
As a result of the recent enactment of sex offender legislation in all
fifty states, many state and federal courts are faced with various constitu-
tional challenges to these laws. 7 1 While most of the challenges to sex of-
65. 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
66. 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
67. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2081-86; Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2142. In Ursey, the
Court addressed a challenge to the constitutionality of a governmental action. See
id. at 2138-39. The Government commenced civil in rem forfeiture proceedings
against Ursery's house, alleging that it was being used to facilitate illegal drug
transactions. See id. Ursery paid $13,250 to the United States to settle the forfei-
ture claim. See id. at 2139. Shortly before the settlement transaction was com-
pleted, however, Ursery was indicted for manufacturing marijuana. See id. He was
subsequently found guilty and sentenced to 63 months in prison. See id. Ursery
argued that he had been "punished" in the forfeiture proceeding that was insti-
tuted against his property and, therefore, the criminal prosecution inflicted a sec-
ond punishment in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See id. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed Ursery's criminal conviction,
holding that the conviction violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United
States Constitution. See id. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certi-
orari. See id. In reversing the Sixth Circuit, the Court, in an opinion by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, held that civil in rem forfeitures were not punishment or crimi-
nal for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See id. at 2142. In Hendricks, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of a Kansas statute providing for the post sen-
tence, involuntary civil commitment of persons who are likely to engage in preda-
tory acts of sexual violence. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2086. Specifically, the Court
held that the law comports with due process requirements and does not violate the
Ex Post Facto or Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States Constitution. See id.
68. See Hendicks, 117 S. Ct. at 2081-82; Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2142.
69. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082; Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2142.
70. See Ursey, 116 S. Ct. at 2142 (holding unanimously that Double Jeopardy
Clause is inapplicable to civil in rem forfeiture actions).
71. For a discussion of state and federal cases in which sex offender registra-
tion and notification laws have been challenged on constitutional grounds, see
supra note 9.
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fender legislation are based on the same constitutional grounds, the
courts addressing these constitutional challenges often reach conflicting
results, particularly with respect to the notification provisions of the
laws. 72
a. Successful Constitutional Challenges to the Notification Provisions
In State v. Myers,73 the Supreme Court of Kansas upheld the constitu-
tionality of the registration provisions of the Kansas Sex Offender Registra-
tion Act (KSORA),74 but held that the public disclosure provision of
KSORA was unconstitutional. 75 In Myers, the court ordered a defendant
who pleaded no contest to aggravated sexual battery to be processed as a
sex offender under KSORA, thereby requiring the defendant to register
with local law enforcement authorities. 76 Because he committed the of-
fense before April 14, 1994, the date KSORA took effect, the defendant
challenged the constitutional validity of the KSORA registration require-
ment on the basis that, as applied to him, it retroactively inflicted a second
punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States
Constitution.77 The Supreme Court of Kansas held that the registration
provisions of KSORA are remedial civil sanctions and, therefore, do not
trigger the protections afforded by the Ex Post Facto Clause.78 With re-
spect to KSORA's public disclosure provision, however, the court held that
by allowing unrestricted public access to the registrant's information, the
public disclosure is excessive and increases the punishment for a crime
after its commission, thereby violating the constitutional prohibition
against ex post facto laws.
79
72. For a discussion of state and federal court decisions addressing the consti-
tutionality of sex offender registration and notification laws in which the courts
have reached differing conclusions, see supra note 10.
73. 923 P.2d 1024 (Kan. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2508 (1997).
74. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-4901 to -4910 (1996).
75. See Myers, 923 P.2d at 1027.
76. See id. In 1991, Myers was convicted of one count of sexual battery and
one count of rape. See id. The Kansas Court of Appeals reversed his convictions
and remanded the case for a new trial. See id. The Supreme Court of Kansas af-
firmed the decision of the Kansas Court of Appeals. See id. On August 15, 1994,
Myers pleaded no contest to the aggravated sexual battery of a 17 year-old girl who
was assisting her mother in cleaning Myers' law office. See id. Subsequently, Myers
was ordered to be processed under the Kansas Sex Offender Registration Act
(KSORA) as a sex offender, which is defined as any person convicted of a named
offense on or after July 1, 1993. See id. After his no contest plea in 1994, Myers
filed a motion to eliminate KSORA's registration requirement. See id. Myers chal-
lenged the constitutionality of KSORA, claiming that it violated the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the United States Constitution. See id. Myers' motion was denied and he
appealed to the Supreme Court of Kansas. See id.
77. See id. at 1026-27.
78. See id. at 1041.
79. See id. at 1043. The Supreme Court of Kansas focused on two factors in
evaluating the constitutionality of KSORA's public disclosure provision. See id. at
1041-43. Specifically, the court looked to the scope and the effects of KSORA's
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Similarly, in Doe v. Pataki,80 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York held the retroactive application of the regis-
tration provisions of the New York State Sex Offender Registration Act
(NYSSORA) 81 to be constitutional, but also held the retroactive applica-
tion of NYSSORA's public notification provisions to be precluded by the
Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.8 2 In Pataki, three
convicted sex offenders challenged the retroactive application of
NYSSORA under the Ex Post Facto Clause because they committed their
crimes before NYSSORA took effect.8 3 Employing an analysis substantially
similar to that used by the Myers court, the Pataki court held that the regis-
tration provisions of the Act do not constitute punishment because they
do not result in the same negative consequences that follow public notifi-
cation.8 4 By contrast, however, the court held that the notification provi-
public disclosure provision. See id. The court concluded that the scope of public
disclosure under KSORA is excessive because "KSORA places no restrictions on
who is given access to the registered offender information or what that person
does with the information." Id. at 1041. With respect to the effects of KSORA's
public disclosure provision, the court concluded that the provision has both a de-
terrent and retributive effect. See id. The court also concluded, however, that the
nonpunitive purpose of KSORA could not be accomplished without the public
disclosure provision. See id. According to the court, if the statute had limited pub-
lic disclosure to that necessary to protect the public, the public disclosure could be
viewed as incidental to the nonpunitive, remedial purpose. See id. Because the
public disclosure is unlimited, however, KSORA impermissibly imposes punish-
ment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. See id. at 1044.
80. 940 F. Supp. 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd in part, rev'd in part, 120 F.3d 1263
(2d Cir. 1997).
81. N.Y. CoRRECr. LAW § 168 (McKinney 1997).
82. See Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 604-05.
83. See id. at 604. The New York State Sex Offender Registration Act
(NYSSORA) was passed on July 25, 1995, and it took effect on January 21, 1996. See
id. at 605. Under NYSSORA, convicted sex offenders are required to register with
local law enforcement authorities after parole or release. See id. at 604. According
to the public notification provisions of NYSSORA, law enforcement authorities are
permitted to provide the public with the identity and location of the registrant. See
id.
The plaintiffs in this action were three convicted sex offenders. See id. at 608.
In 1990, plaintiff John Doe was convicted of first degree attempted rape in New
York and sentenced to prison. See id. In 1994, Doe was released on parole, remain-
ing on parole since that time without incident. See id. On February 5, 1996, Doe
was notified that he had been officially classified as a "level three sex offender"
subject to lifetime registration. See id. In 1995, plaintiff Richard Roe was convicted
in New York of a crime involving first degree sexual abuse. See id. As a result, Roe
was sentenced to probation, remaining on probation since that time without inci-
dent. See id. In 1989, plaintiff Samuel Poe was convicted of attempted sodomy in
the first degree in New York. See id. Poe was sentenced to a period of incarcera-
tion and was entitled to immediate conditional release at the time the action was
filed. See id. Upon release, however, Poe would be on parole under the supervi-
sion of the Division of Parole. See id. Pursuant to NYSSORA, Poe was required to
be officially classified prior to being released on parole. See id.
84. See id. at 605. The court stated that "there are some punitive aspects to
registration [but] ultimately ... registration is regulatory and not punitive." Id. at
629.
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sions of NYSSORA constitute punishment, concluding that the retroactive
application of the notification provisions would therefore violate the Ex
Post Facto Clause.
8 5
The Pataki court based its conclusion on an analysis of four factors:
intent, design, history and effects.8 6 First, the court noted that although
the legislature's stated intent in passing NYSSORA was to protect the pub-
lic from repeat sex offenders, which is remedial in nature, it was evident
that the legislature also intended to inflict punishment on sex offenders.
8 7
Second, the court concluded that the design of NYSSORA, which contains
the "classic indicia of a punitive scheme," suggests that the notification
provisions are punitive in nature.8 8 Third, the court stated that a histori-
cal analysis suggests that notification is punitive because "notification is
the modern-day equivalent of branding and banishment," which have tra-
ditionally been recognized as punitive measures. 89 Fourth and finally, the
court concluded that the overall effect of NYSSORA is to punish the of-
fender because public notification serves the traditional goals of punish-
ment: retribution, incapacitation and deterrence. 90
Moreover, in Roe v. Office of Adult Probation,9 1 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Connecticut held that the community notifi-
cation provisions of Connecticut's sex offender notification policy
85. See id. at 604-05. The court stated that the "public notification provisions
[of New York's Megan's Law] are quintessentially punitive in nature." Id. at 604.
86. See id. at 604-05.
87. See id. at 604.
88. See id. at 605. The court elaborated on this factor as follows:
[NYSSORA] contains the classic indicia of a punitive scheme: it is trig-
gered by the commission of a crime; it provides for the sentencing judge
to determine the level of notification; and it provides for the submission
of victim impact statements. Moreover, [NYSSORA] is excessive in its
sweep, covering an overly broad group of offenses and individuals and
permitting broad and virtually uncontrolled disclosure.
Id.
89. Id.
90. See id. In commenting on the negative effects of public notification, the
court stated that "[p]ublic notification results in an affirmative disability or re-
straint on sex offenders and their families." Id. The court also found that public
notification hinders the rehabilitation of sex offenders, which has the effect of
increasing their punishment. See id.
After the district court's decision in Pataki the state agencies and officials ap-
pealed and the three sex offenders cross-appealed; the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit held that the registration and notification provisions
of NYSSORA did not inflict punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
See Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1265 (2d Cir. 1997). The Second Circuit recog-
nized that the specific issue was whether NYSSORA inflicted punishment, in which
case the Ex Post Facto Clause would prevent application of NYSSORA to individu-
als who committed their offenses prior to the enactment of the Act. See id. Con-
cluding that the registration and notification provisions of NYSSORA were
remedial, the Second Circuit rejected the proffered analogy comparing the notifi-
cation provisions of NYSSORA to the shaming punishments of colonial America.
See id. at 1284.
91. 938 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Conn. 1996), rev'd, 125 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1997).
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guidelines constitute punishment, concluding that their retroactive appli-
cation would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Consti-
tution. 92 Engaging in an analysis similar to that used by the Pataki court,
the Roe court focused on three factors in determining the constitutionality
of the community notification provisions: design, history and effect.
9 3
First, the court noted that application of the community notification provi-
sions imposes an affirmative disability on an individual. 94 Specifically, the
court concluded that community notification was an "affirmative place-
ment by the State of a form of public stigma" on the registrants. 95 Second,
the court recognized that the practice of community notification is
"closely akin" to what is historically viewed as punishment.9 6 Third and
finally, the court stated that the effect of community notification is to pun-
ish sex offenders because community notification results in deterrence,
which is a traditional goal of punishment.
97
92. See id. at 1091. In addition to alleging that the application of the Connect-
icut sex offender registration law violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, the plaintiff in
Roe also raised several other constitutional challenges to the law as applied in his
case. See id. at 1085. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the law violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause and
the Double Jeopardy Clause. See id. Because the court determined that the retro-
active application of the Connecticut sex offender registration law violated the Ex
Post Facto Clause, it did not address the other constitutional issues raised by the
plaintiff. See id. at 1087 (noting that initial Complaint also alleged violation of
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, which was not
pursued in Second Amended Complaint).
In 1989, the police arrested the plaintiff in Roe, Robert Roe, for sexual assault.
See id. at 1082. In May of 1991, Roe entered into a plea agreement in which he
agreed to plead no contest to six counts of sexual assault and six counts of risk of
injury to a minor. See id. In August of 1991, Roe was sentenced to 12 years impris-
onment and five years probation. See id. Roe remained in prison until he was
released on parole in August of 1994. See id. at 1082-83. Roe's parole was revoked
in December of 1994 after he violated the terms of his parole. See id. at 1083. As a
result, Roe returned to prison for eight months to complete his original sentence.
See id. The state subsequently released Roe from prison in August of 1995 and,
pursuant to his sentence, placed him on probation under the supervision of the
Office of Adult Probation (OAP). See id. According to the Connecticut General
Assembly, Connecticut's sex offender registration law applied to individuals con-
victed of sexual assault on or afterJanuary 1, 1995. See id. Roe brought the present
action after his probation officer informed him that he was planning to inform
Roe's "employer, neighbors and the general community of [Roe's] prior criminal
record." Id. at 1084-85.
93. See id. at 1091-94.
94. See id. at 1092. ("[T]his court concludes that the effect of the community
notification does amount to an affirmative disability.").
95. Id.
96. See id.
97. See id. The court stated that the "punitive effects of community notifica-
tion . . .are not merely incidental to an overriding non-punitive purpose." Id. at
1093. After the district court's decision in Roe, the State appealed the order en-
tered by the district court, which preliminarily enjoined the retroactive application
of OAP's sex offender notification policy guidelines to the plaintiff. See Roe v.
Office of Adult Probation, 125 F.3d 47, 47 (2d Cir. 1997). The United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the order of the district court, conclud-
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b. Unsuccessful Constitutional Challenges to the Notification
Provisions
Not all courts, however, have found the notification provisions of sex
offender legislation to be unconstitutional.9 8 In a recent federal case, Doe
v. Gregoire,99 the United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington held that the Ex Post Facto Clause did not prohibit the en-
forcement of the Washington Community Protection Act (WCPA), which
provides for the registration of convicted sex offenders and notification to
law enforcement agencies.10 0 In Gregoire, a Washington prisoner alleged
that application of WCPA, which was passed in 1990, would impermissibly
increase the punishment for his crime committed five years prior to
WCPA's enactment.1 01 According to the court, the threshold issue was
whether the challenged legislation was remedial or punitive in nature.10 2
Concluding that the statutory requirements of registration and notifica-
tion were regulatory, not punitive, the court held that they could be ap-
plied retroactively without triggering the protections afforded by the Ex
Post Facto Clause.1 0
3
Although the Gregoire court held that the provisions of WCPA provid-
ing for notification to law enforcement agencies are constitutional, the
court distinguished notification to law enforcement agencies from
broader community notification by noting that the latter would violate the
Ex Post Facto Clause.1 0 4 The court focused on the effects of community
notification by reviewing historical analogues comparable to community
notification.1 0 5 By doing so, the court found that the punitive effects of
community notification, which include the infliction of humiliation, ostra-
cism and the exposure of the sex offenders to hostility, harassment and
ing that the "plaintiff's ex post facto challenge [to OAP's notification policy guide-
lines] must be rejected." Id. at 55. The Second Circuit stated that the underlying
intent of OAP's notification policy guidelines is regulatory and non-punitive. See
id. In addition, the Second Circuit concluded that the plaintiff failed to demon-
strate that notification pursuant to OAP's notification policy guidelines constitutes
punishment. See id.
98. For a discussion of cases in which the court determined that the notifica-
tion provisions of sex offender legislation were constitutional, see infra notes 99-
118 and accompanying text.
99. 960 F. Supp. 1478 (W.D. Wash. 1997), affd sub nom. Russell v. Gregoire,
124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 1997).
100. See id. at 1484 (stating that registration and notification provisions of
Washington Community Protection Act (WCPA) "are regulatory, not punitive, and
may be applied to plaintiff without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause").
101. See id. at 1481-82.
102. See id. at 1481 ("The key issue is whether the statute's public notification
provisions are punitive or merely regulatory; if punitive, they cannot be enforced
against the plaintiff.").
103. See id. at 1484.
104. See id. at 1486.
105. See id. at 1485-86.
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reprisal, are "dominant and inescapable."'10 6 The court also analogized
community notification to historical punishments that were designed to
inflict shame, humiliation and public hatred.10 7 Specifically, the court
noted the similarities between community notification and the stocks, pil-
lory and facial markings of colonial America. 10 8
c. Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Challenges in the Third Circuit
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
addressed the constitutionality of sex offender registration and notifica-
tion laws. 10 9 In Artway v. Attorney General,110 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the registra-
tion and Tier 1 notification provisions of New Jersey's Megan's Law, con-
cluding that the challenged provisions did not inflict punishment in
106. Id. at 1486.
107. See id.
108. See id. After the district court's ruling in Gregoire, the plaintiff appealed
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the constitu-
tionality of WCPA, concluding that the registration, law enforcement notification
and community notification provisions of WCPA did not amount to punishment in
violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. See Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1094
(9th Cir. 1997). Although the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the
pertinent inquiry was whether the registration and notification provisions of
WCPA impermissibly inflicted punishment, the Ninth Circuit rejected the district
court's finding that community notification was analogous to the shaming punish-
ments of colonial America. See id. at 1087-88. The Ninth Circuit was not per-
suaded by the proffered analogy to historical shaming punishments, adding that
the analogy was not strong enough to overcome WCPA's remedial and nonpuni-
tive intent. See id. at 1088. Specifically, the court stated that it was influenced by
the "strong remedial goals of the notification provision." Id. at 1093. The court
also concluded that a proper historical analysis would be very difficult because the
challenged notification provisions of WCPA do not have "identical historical ante-
cedents." Id. at 1091.
In addition, the court drew a distinction between the notification provisions
of WCPA and the shaming punishments of colonial America, an analogy that was
relied upon by the district court. See id. According to the court, the main distinc-
tion could be summarized as follows: "Historical shaming punishments like whip-
ping, pillory, and branding generally required the physical participation of the
offender, and typically required a direct confrontation between the offender and
the members of the public." Id. The court noted that the more appropriate com-
parison was between community notification and "wanted" posters, adding that
"wanted" posters "have not been regarded as punishment, though they disclose
essentially the same information [as community notification], may rouse public
excitement, and may carry a greater risk of vigilantism." Id. at 1092. While the
court conceded that the shaming punishments of colonial America often relied on
humiliation, the court also noted that "humiliation alone does not constitute pun-
ishment." Id. Thus, the court held that the notification provisions were intended
to be regulatory, not punitive. See id. at 1093.
109. See Artway v. Attorney General, 81 F.3d 1235, 1242 (3d Cir. 1996) (ad-
dressing constitutionality of Megan's Law).
110. 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996).
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violation of the Ex Post Facto or Double Jeopardy Clauses. 1 In Artway,
Alexander Artway, a convicted sex offender recently released from prison,
sought an injunction against enforcement of the registration and commu-
nity notification provisions of Megan's Law claiming that application of
Megan's Law impermissibly inflicted a second punishment in violation of
the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States Con-
stitution.1 1 2 Specifically, Artway claimed that Megan's Law is analogous to
"that most famous badge of punishment: the Scarlet Letter," a shaming
punishment practiced in colonial America. u1 3
In Artway, the Third Circuit limited the scope of its holding to the
registration and Tier 1 notification provisions, declining to address the
111. See id. at 1271. The Third Circuit's decision in Artway was not limited to
ex post facto and double jeopardy challenges. See id. at 1242. The plaintiff, Alex-
ander Artway, also claimed that the application of Megan's Law violates the Bill of
Attainder, Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. See id. In addition, Artway
also argued that Megan's Law is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him be-
cause it forces him to "guess" whether he is covered by the law. See id. at 1269, The
court not only held that the registration and Tier 1 notification provisions of
Megan's Law do not violate the Ex Post Facto or Double Jeopardy Clauses, but also
that the challenged provisions do not violate the Bill of Attainder, Equal Protec-
tion or Due Process Clauses. See id. at 1242-43. Finally, the court held that
Megan's Law is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Artway because the law
provides fair notice and his duty under Megan's Law is "patent." See id. at 1269-70.
112. See id. at 1242.
113. Id. at 1265. Artway contended that application of Megan's Law, like the
"scarlet letter" of literary fame, resulted in "public ostracism and opprobrium." Id.
The Third Circuit faced a similar argument in United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814,
825 (3d Cir. 1981). In Criden, the court rejected a tendered analogy between the
media rebroadcast of material placed into evidence at a criminal trial and the
shaming punishments of colonial America. See id. Accordingly, the court reversed
an order of the district court denying the application of television networks "for
permission to copy, for the purpose of broadcasting to the public, those video and
audio tapes admitted into evidence and played to the jury in open court" during
the criminal trial of two members of the Philadelphia City Council. Id. at 815.
In Criden, a number of local, state and federal public officials were tried on
charges of bribery and related offenses allegedly committed during the course of a
"sting" operation initiated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. See id. Prior to
the start of the trial, representatives of ABC, NBC, CBS and Westinghouse Broad-
casting, Inc., requested permission to copy and broadcast to the public, the video
and audio tapes introduced into evidence. See id. at 816. The request was denied.
See id. Subsequently, the television networks renewed their request, but the district
court denied their request again. See United States v. Criden, 501 F. Supp. 854,
863 (E.D. Pa. 1980). Following the second denial, the television networks ap-
pealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. See Criden, 648
F.2d at 814. The Third Circuit, in reversing the order of the district court, stated
that the networks were entitled to copy and broadcast the video and audio tapes
on the basis of the "strong common law presumption of access." Id. at 829. In
addition, the court noted that the request of the networks should be granted be-
cause of the "educational and informational benefit[s] which the public would
derive from broadcast of evidence introduced at a trial which raised significant
issues of public interest." Id.
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broader notification required for Tier 2 and Tier 3 registrants.' 14 Because
the Supreme Court has not devised a consistent, coherent and principled
means for determining what constitutes punishment, the Third Circuit
sought to "divine" a "test for punishment."' 15 After reviewing the relevant
Supreme Court case law and looking for common considerations, the
Artway court harmonized the often conflicting decisions and developed an
analytical framework to determine whether a particular legislative provi-
sion's goal was to punish. 1 6 After applying the newly-developed analytical
framework, the court concluded that the registration and Tier 1 notifica-
114. See Artway, 81 F.3d at 1242. The Third Circuit refused to address the
constitutionality of the Megan's Law notification required in situations involving
Tier 2 and Tier 3 registrants, stating that those issues were "unripe." See id.
115. Id. at 1254.
116. See id. at 1254, 1263-67 (synthesizing relevant Supreme Court case law
and developing analytical framework, including three-prong test, for determining
if measure is nonpunitive). The Artway court looked to six Supreme Court cases in
developing the analytical framework. See id. at 1254-63 (citing California Dep't of
Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 504, 510 (1995) (shifting focus of court's
determination regarding whether challenged measure is punishment to effects of
measure and establishing that appropriate analysis is flexible and context depen-
dent); Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 779 (1994) (ex-
panding on historical inquiry previously undertaken by Supreme Court); Austin v.
United States, 509 U.S. 602, 603 (1993) (focusing on history as part of "punish-
ment" test); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989) (articulating objec-
tive legislative intent test); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69
(1963) (establishing multi-factor analysis to determine whether challenged mea-
sure constitutes punishment, which would trigger criminal process guarantees);
DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960) (announcing subjective, or actual,
legislative purpose test)).
The Artway court primarily focused on the Supreme Court's decision in Men-
doza-Martinez, which established a seven factor analytical framework for determin-
ing whether a legislative measure constitutes "punishment." See Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S. at 168-69. In Mendoza-Martinez, the Court noted that all seven of the fac-
tors are relevant to the determination and that each of the factors may often point
in a different direction. See id. at 169. The seven factor framework was summa-
rized by the Court:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deter-
rence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,
whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is
assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alter-
native purpose assigned ....
Id. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted). The Mendoza-Martinez test is not without its crit-
ics. See Prevention Versus Punishment, supra note 22, at 1720-22 (discussing criticisms
of Mendoza-Martinez test as applied to sex offender legislation). Critics argue that
the list of factors articulated in Mendoza-Martinez is "far too open-ended to yield
consistent results, especially as applied to sex offender statutes." Id. at 1721. In
addition, it has been noted that some of the Mendoza-Martinez factors are "patently
inapplicable" to sex offender legislation. See id. at 1722 (noting that ambiguities in
Mendoza-Martinez factors preclude reliance on factors in evaluation of sex offender
legislation). Consequently, critics argue that the Mendoza-Martinez "'test' is not
well-suited to the evaluation of sex offender statutes." Id.
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tion provisions of Megan's Law do not impermissibly inflict unconstitu-
tional punishment. 117 This analytical framework and the court's ruling
and rationale regarding the constitutionality of the Tier 1 notification pro-
visions of Megan's Law would eventually provide the foundation for the
Third Circuit's subsequent decision in E.B. v. Verniero, in which the Tier 2
and Tier 3 notification provisions of Megan's Law were challenged on the
same constitutional grounds.1 18
III. FACTS: E.B. v. VEIR.'wO
In 1974, E.B. was sentenced to thirty-three years in prison after plead-
ing guilty in the Superior Court of New Jersey to three counts of sexual
abuse involving young boys.11 9 Two years later, in the Virginia Circuit
Court, E.B. pled guilty to two separate murders and the court sentenced
him to concurrent terms of twenty years, which were to run consecutively
with the New Jersey sentence.12 0 In 1979, after E.B. served less than six
years of his thirty-three year New Jersey sentence, he was paroled and ex-
tradited to Virginia to serve the murder sentences. 121 Subsequently, in
June of 1989, E.B. was paroled by Virginia.' 2 2 E.B., who is presently free,
will remain subject to supervised release by the New Jersey Bureau of Pa-
role until July 23, 2006.123
Pursuant to the statutory requirements of Megan's Law, E.B. regis-
tered with the local law enforcement authorities in Englewood, New
Jersey. 124 On October 24, 1995, the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office
117. See Artway, 81 F.3d at 1271. There were two noteworthy aspects of the
Third Circuit's decision in Artway. See id. at 1243, 1263-67. The first noteworthy
aspect was that the court devoted a significant portion of its opinion to explaining,
analyzing and synthesizing prior case law that addressed the issue of what consti-
tutes punishment. See id. at 1263-67. In doing so, the court developed an analyti-
cal framework for determining if a measure impermissibly inflicts punishment in
violation of the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses. See id. The second
noteworthy aspect of Artway was the narrow scope of the court's holding. See id. at
1242. The Third Circuit limited the scope of its holding to the constitutionality of
the registration and Tier 1 notification provisions of Megan's Law, declining to
address the constitutionality of the Tier 2 and Tier 3 notification provisions. See id.
at 1242-43. The court concluded that Artway's challenges to the notification provi-
sions that accompany Tier 2 and Tier 3 classification "fail[ed] ... the ripeness
test." Id. at 1251.
118. See E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1093-1105 (3d Cir. 1997) (applying
analytical framework developed in Artway to determine if community notification
provisions of Megan's Law impermissibly inflict punishment in violation of Ex Post
Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1039 (1998).
119. See id. at 1087.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2b(1) (West 1995 & Supp. 1997)
(requiring all persons who complete sentence for certain designated crimes involv-
ing sexual assault to register with local law enforcement authorities).
NOTE
27
DeMatteo: Welcome to Anytown, U.S.A. - Home of Beautiful Scenery (and a Con
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
notified E.B. that he had been classified as a Tier 3 sex offender.125 Based
on E.B.'s Tier 3 classification, the Bergen County prosecutor proposed to
issue notification to "all public and private educational institutions and
organizations within a one-half mile radius of [E.B.'s] home, and all par-
ties who resided or worked within a one block radius of [E.B.'s] home."126
Upon E.B.'s objection to his Tier 3 classification and the proposed
notification plan, the New Jersey Superior Court held a hearing.' 27 On
December 18, 1995, the court ruled that E.B.'s Tier 3 classification was
appropriate and permitted notification to proceed according to the prose-
cutor's proposed plan. 128 E.B. appealed to the New Jersey Appellate Divi-
sion and then to the New Jersey Supreme Court, but both appeals were
unsuccessful.1 29 E.B. then filed a federal action in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of New Jersey seeking a preliminary injunction
to enjoin the defendants from implementing the proposed notification
plan. 130 The district court promptly entered a preliminary injunction, en-
joining the defendants from implementing the proposed Tier 3 notifica-
tion plan.1 3 1 Upon entry of the preliminary injunction by the district
court and a subsequent order denying the defendant's application for a
stay of the preliminary injunction, the defendants filed an appeal in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.' 32 On appeal, the
Third Circuit held that the Tier 2 and Tier 3 notification provisions of
Megan's Law do not inflict punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto or
Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States Constitution. 33
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In holding that the community notification provisions of Megan's
Law do not violate the Ex Post Facto or Double Jeopardy Clauses, the
Third Circuit first noted that the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy
Clauses are not implicated unless the state has inflicted punishment.1 3 4
125. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1087.
126. Id. at 1087-88.
127. See id. at 1088.
128. See id. The court permitted notification to the following: "(1) 82 public
and private educational institutions, licensed day care centers and summer camps
in Englewood, Teaneck, Bergenfield, Tenafly, Englewood Cliffs, Leonia and Fort
Lee, and (2) all residences within a one block radius of E.B.'s house." Id.
129. See id. During the pendency of the proceedings, however, notification
remained stayed by order of the court. See id.
130. See id. The defendants included the Attorney General of NewJersey, the
Bergen County Prosecutor and the local police chief. See id. at 1087.
131. See E.B. v. Poritz, 914 F. Supp. 85, 92 (D.N.J. 1996), rev'd, 119 F.3d 1077
(3d Cir. 1997), and cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1039 (1998).
132. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1088.
133. See id. at 1111.
134. See id. at 1092. Prior to addressing the ex post facto and double jeopardy
issues, the Third Circuit first addressed a threshold jurisdictional issue. See id. at
1090-92. The appellants contended that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction under the doctrine articulated by the Supreme Court in Rooker v. Fidel-
[Vol. 43: p. 581
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Accordingly, the Third Circuit noted that the critical issue is whether the
community notification required under Megan's Law, in situations involv-
ing Tier 2 and Tier 3 registrants, is punishment for purposes of the Ex
Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses.' 3 5
ity Trust, 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462 (1983). See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1090.
The Third Circuit began its analysis of the jurisdictional question by first not-
ing that 28 U.S.C. § 1257 grants appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court of the
United States. See id. (noting that this appellate jurisdiction is affirmative grant of
power to Supreme Court to review final judgments of highest courts of each state)
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1994)). The court noted that "by negative implication,"
the "Rooker-Feldman" doctrine suggests that the lower federal courts lack subject
matter jurisdiction to review judgments of the highest state courts. See id. The
Third Circuit has interpreted the "Rooker-Feldman" doctrine as also covering the
final judgments of lower state courts. See, e.g., Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass'n
v. Port Auth., 973 F.2d 169, 177-78 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that "Rooker-Feldman"
doctrine precludes federal district courts from reviewing final judgments of lower
state courts).
In support of their argument, the appellants first noted that E.B. received
judicial review of his Tier 3 classification and the prosecutor's proposed notifica-
tion plan in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division. See E.B., 119 F.3d at
1090 (noting that E.B. advanced several federal constitutional arguments to pre-
vent classification and notification plan from being implemented). After the New
Jersey Superior Court rejected E.B.'s challenge and ordered that the prosecutor
proceed with the proposed notification plan, E.B. appealed to the New Jersey Ap-
pellate Division, which affirmed the lower court's ruling. See id. Subsequently, the
Supreme Court of NewJersey denied E.B.'s petition for certification of appeal. See
id. The appellants emphasized that the relief sought by E.B. from the Third Cir-
cuit in the present case is an injunction that would effectively prevent the notifica-
tion ordered by the NewJersey Superior Court from being carried out. See id. The
appellants argued that in light of the "Rooker-Feldman" doctrine, the United States
District Court for the District of NewJersey was without subject matter jurisdiction.
See id.
The Third Circuit agreed with the appellants and held that the district court
did not have proper subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 1090-91. The court
noted that for the district court to be able to grant E.B. relief, the district court
would be required to determine that the NewJersey court's judgment was errone-
ous, which would violate the "Rooker-Feldman" doctrine. See id. at 1091. Accord-
ingly, the Third Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded
with instructions to dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 1092.
135. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1092 (recognizing that both parties agreed that
"punishment" has same meaning under Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy
Clauses); see also Feldman, supra note 9, at 1085 (stating that central issue when
determining constitutionality of Megan's Law under Ex Post Facto Clause is
whether sex offender community notification constitutes punishment); Stephen R.
McAllister, The Constitutionality of Kansas Laws Targeting Sex Offenders, 36 WASHBURN
L.J. 419, 439 (1997) (stating that primary issue in constitutional challenges based
on Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses is whether community notification
applies new punishment to crime already committed); G. Scott Rafshoon, Com-
ment, Community Notification of Sex Offenders: Issues of Punishment, Privacy, and Due
Process, 44 EMORy L.J. 1633, 1670-71 (1995) (discussing constitutionality of sex of-
fender community notification laws).
While many of the courts that have addressed ex post facto and double jeop-
ardy challenges to sex offender registration and notification laws have recognized
that the central issue is whether the law impermissibly imposes punishment, it has
been noted that "punishment" is an ambiguous concept. See Doe v. Pataki, 120
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A. Application of the Artway Framework
The court began its constitutional analysis of the community notifica-
tion provisions of Megan's Law by looking to the analytical framework it
developed in Artway v. Attorney General.136 According to the Artway frame-
work, a challenged measure must pass the following three-prong test in
order to constitute nonpunishment: (1) the actual (legislative) purpose of
the measure must be nonpunitive; (2) the objective purpose of the mea-
sure must be nonpunitive; and (3) the effects of the measure must be
nonpunitive.1
3 7
F.3d 1263, 1272 (2d Cir. 1997) ("'Punishment' ... is an imprecise concept with
meanings that vary depending on the purpose for which the concept is defined.").
Furthermore, the term "punishment" has been noted to have many synonyms, in-
cluding penal, punitive, penalty and criminal. See id, A review of definitions of
punishment found in the legal literature can be somewhat helpful. See, e.g., Note,
Toward a Constitutional Definition of Punishment, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1667, 1678-81
(1980) ("Punishment is the deprivation of legal rights in response to a prior of-
fense for the purpose of deterrence and social condemnation.").
136. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1093 (discussing analytical framework developed by
Third Circuit in Artway); Artway v. Attorney General, 81 F.3d 1235, 1263-67 (3d
Cir. 1996) (developing analytical framework for determining if registration and
Tier 1 notification provisions of Megan's Law constitute punishment in violation of
Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses).
137. See Artway, 81 F.3d at 1263. Prior to applying the Artway framework, how-
ever, the Third Circuit first addressed the argument that in light of two recent
Supreme Court decisions, Artway no longer provides the appropriate standard for
determining whether a challenged measure impermissibly inflicts unconstitutional
punishment. See EB., 119 F.3d at 1094 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072
(1997); United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996)).
In Ursery, the Supreme Court held that civil in rem forfeitures do not consti-
tute punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause even if the value of
the forfeited property is arguably excessive when compared to the harm inflicted
on the government from the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture. See Ursety, 116 S.
Ct. at 2149. The Third Circuit noted, however, that the holding of Ursery is narrow
and strictly limited to civil forfeitures. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1094. In addition, ac-
cording to the court, nothing in the Supreme Court's punishment analysis is in-
consistent with the Artway framework. See id. In Hendricks, the Supreme Court
upheld a Kansas statute providing for the post-sentence, involuntary civil commit-
ment of "sexually violent predators." See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2086. The Third
Circuit emphasized that the Hendricks Court did not establish a "single formula"
for determining which legislative measures constitute punishment but instead only
established that courts should give substantial deference to legislative judgment
when reviewing the constitutionality of challenged legislation. See E.B., 119 F.3d at
1095-96. The Third Circuit did note, however, that certain portions of the
Supreme Court's analysis in Hendricks provide guidance in the determination of
whether challenged legislation constitutes punishment. See id. at 1096. Thus, the
Court stated that while a civil label is not always dispositive, the Court "will reject
the legislature's manifest intent only where a party challenging the statute provides
'the clearest proof" that 'the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or
effect as to negate [the State's] intention' to deem it 'civil.'" Hendricks, 117 S. Ct.
at 2082 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)). In light of
Hendricks, the Third Circuit concluded that similar deference to the judgment of
the legislature is required whenever legislative measures are challenged under the
Ex Post Facto and DoubleJeopardy Clauses. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1096. Therefore,
after distinguishing Ursery and Hendricks from the case before the court, the Third
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1. Actual (Legislative) Purpose
Under the first prong of the Artway framework, the Third Circuit had
to determine whether the NewJersey legislature's actual purpose in enact-
ing Megan's Law was to punish sex offenders.1 3 8 After rejecting the appel-
lants' argument that the legislative purpose of community notification is
to punish sex offenders, the Third Circuit concluded that because the leg-
islative purpose of community notification is remedial and nonpunitive, it
satisfies the actual purpose prong of the Artway framework.1 3 9
In arriving at this conclusion, the court examined whether the nega-
tive effects on the registrants result from a desire of the NewJersey Legisla-
ture to punish sex offenders for past conduct or whether the negative
effects are merely a "by-product" of a legitimate legislative effort aimed at
remedying a perceived societal problem.140 After examining the state-
ment of purpose of Megan's Law, the court concluded that the legislative
purpose of Megan's Law was to identify potential repeat sex offenders,
notify the public when necessary for public safety and help prevent and
promptly resolve incidents involving sexual abuse and missing persons.14 '
The court then noted that protecting the public and preventing crimes,
Circuit concluded that nothing in Ursery or Hendricks justifies abandoning the pre-
viously-established and judicially-tested Artway framework. See id. at 1094, 1096.
138. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1096. Since 1898, the Supreme Court has focused
on the legislative intent underlying a challenged measure as the touchstone of the
ex post facto analysis. See Hawker v. NewYork, 170 U.S. 189, 191 (1898) (focusing
on legislative intent while engaging in ex post facto analysis). In Hawker, the
Supreme Court focused exclusively on the legislature's intent in rejecting an ex
post facto challenge against an 1893 law that prohibited persons who had been
convicted of a felony from practicing medicine. See id. at 196. Specifically, the
Court stated: "The state [was] not seeking to further punish a criminal, but only to
protect its citizens from physicians of bad character." Id. The approach taken by
the Court in Hawker, focusing on the intended purpose served by the retroactively
applied measure, has been repeatedly reaffirmed since 1898. See, e.g., Trop v. Dul-
les, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958) ("In deciding whether or not a law is penal [for pur-
poses of ex post facto analysis], this Court has generally based its determination
upon the purpose of the statute.").
139. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1096-97.
140. See id. at 1093, 1096. With respect to this first prong, the Artway court
stated: "If the legislature intended Megan's Law to be 'punishment,' i.e., retribu-
tion was one of its actual purposes, then it must fail constitutional scrutiny. If, on
the other hand, 'the restriction of the individual comes about as a relative incident
to a regulation,' the measure will pass this first prong." Artway, 81 F.3d at 1263
(quoting DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960)).
141. See N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:7-1 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997) (declaring legisla-
tive statement of purpose behind Megan's Law). The Third Circuit noted that the
only legislative history of Megan's Law is the following statement, which accompa-
nied the bill when it was first introduced into the New Jersey Senate:
Heinous crimes have been committed against children after [sex offend-
ers'] release from incarceration. The most recent case involves the tragic
rape and murder of seven-year-old Megan Kanka of Hamilton Township
by a neighbor who had committed sex offenses against children. Resi-
dents of the neighborhood had no knowledge of the man's criminal
history.
19981 NoTE
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two of the stated legislative objectives of Megan's Law, are types of pur-
poses that the Supreme Court has traditionally found to be regulatory, not
punitive. 142
The court then examined the appellants' argument that the context
in which Megan's Law was enacted, referring to the quick response from
the NewJersey Legislature following the murder of Megan Kanka, is indic-
ative of a punitive intent on the part of the legislature. 143 The court, how-
ever, disagreed with this contention and found the legislative context
surrounding the enactment of Megan's Law to be "entirely consistent with
its declared remedial purpose."'144 Therefore, the Third Circuit stated
that it had no basis for questioning the New Jersey Legislature's stated
purpose for enacting Megan's Law, which it found to be "remedial and
devoid of any indication of an intent to punish."1 45 Accordingly, in light
of the substantial deference required by Hendricks, the Third Circuit de-
ferred to the legislature's judgment and concluded that the community
notification provisions of Megan's Law passed the actual purpose test.14 6
2. Objective Purpose
The second prong of the Artway framework focuses on the actual op-
eration of the challenged legislation and considers whether courts have
traditionally regarded analogous historical measures as punitive. 147 In
Artway, the Third Circuit stated that before determining whether a chal-
lenged measure constitutes punishment under the objective purpose
prong, the court must consider three separate factors.148 First, the court
must consider the measure's proportionality-can the measure be ex-
Because sex offenders are likely to be unsusceptible to the "cures"
offered by the prison system, the urges that cause them to commit of-
fenses can never be eliminated but merely controlled. The danger posed
by the presence of a sex offender who has committed violent acts against
children requires a system of notification to protect the public safety and
welfare of the community.
E.B., 119 F.3d at 1097 n.17; see also Artway, 81 F.3d at 1264 (noting that minimal
amount of legislative history accompanied Megan's Law when first introduced into
New Jersey Legislature).
142. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1097 (discussing stated legislative purposes of
Megan's Law and Supreme Court jurisprudence relevant to determination of
whether stated legislative purposes are regulatory or punitive in nature) (citing
Deveau, 363 U.S. at 160).
143. See id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See id.; see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2082 (1997) (recog-
nizing that substantial deference must be accorded to legislature's judgment when
determining whether challenged legislative measure is remedial or punitive in
nature).
147. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1093.
148. See Artway v. Attorney General, 81 F.3d 1235, 1263-66 (3d Cir. 1996) (dis-
cussing three factors of objective purpose prong of analytical framework).
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plained solely by a remedial, nonpunitive purpose?149 Second, historical
analogues must be considered-has society traditionally regarded analo-
gous historical measures as punishment? 150 Third, it must be determined
if the challenged measure has both salutary and deterrent effects and, if
so, whether the deterrent purpose outweighs the salutary purpose?15 1
Based on an analysis of these three factors of the objective purpose prong,
the Third Circuit concluded that the community notification provisions of
Megan's Law do not constitute punishment. 152
a. Proportionality
The Third Circuit stated that the central issue under the proportion-
ality aspect of the objective purpose prong is whether the provisions of
Megan's Law providing for the dissemination of information beyond law
enforcement personnel are fully explained by a nonpunitive, legislative
purpose. 153 Thus, the court articulated the pertinent inquiry as whether
the Tier 2 and Tier 3 notification provisions of Megan's Law are reason-
ably related to a legitimate, nonpunitive goal. 154 The Third Circuit con-
cluded that the challenged community notification provisions are
reasonably related to the previously-discussed, nonpunitive goals of
Megan's Law.' 5 5 In addition, the court noted that the NewJersey Legisla-
ture has not attempted to achieve the goals of Megan's Law in such a man-
ner as to impose a burden on the registrants that is clearly greater than the
burden inherent in accomplishing the goals.' 56 Finally, the court con-
cluded that Megan's Law is a "measured response to the identified prob-
lem," the recidivism of sex offenders, that does not uniformly and unfairly
subject all registrants to notification beyond law enforcement
personnel. 57
149. See id. at 1264; see also E.B., 119 F.3d at 1093 (discussing second prong
under Artway analytical framework).
150. See Artway, 81 F.3d at 1265-66 (discussing role of history in determining
whether challenged measure constitutes punishment); see also E.B., 119 F.3d at
1099-1101 (same).
151. See Artway, 81 F.3d at 1266 (noting that because registration is regulatory
technique with salutary purpose, it satisfies third aspect of objective purpose
prong); see also E.B., 119 F.3d at 1101 (applying third aspect of objective purpose
prong of Artway analytical framework).
152. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1097-1101.
153. See id. at 1097.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 1098. The court also stated that the fundamental premise of
Megan's Law is reasonable. See id. The court noted that "[t]he fundamental prem-
ise of Megan's Law is that registration and carefully tailored notification can en-
able law enforcement and those likely to encounter a sex offender to be aware of a
potential danger and 'to stay vigilant against possible re-abuse."' Id. (quoting
Artway, 81 F.3d at 1265).
156. See id.
157. See id. The court noted that the maximum scope of the community noti-
fication plan is determined by the risk assessment procedures. See id. Each of the
three sex offender tier classifications has a different scope of notification. See id.
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While the appellants conceded that the legislative aims of Megan's
Law are remedial in nature, they argued that the range of information
disseminated for Tier 2 and Tier 3 registrants is excessive in light of those
stated remedial aims. 15 8 The appellants also argued that due to the
unique features of each registrant's situation, some of the information
that is disseminated may be unnecessary.1 59 The court was not persuaded
by either argument. 160 While the court conceded that some of the dissem-
inated information may be unnecessary in certain cases, it quickly added
that the legislature's decision not to tailor notification plans for each par-
ticular registrant is consistent with the good faith pursuit of the statute's
declared remedial purpose. 161
b. Historical Precedent
After the court found a reasonable "fit" between the stated remedial
goals of Megan's Law and the legislative means chosen to effectuate those
goals, the court turned to an analysis of historical precedents.1 62 Under
this aspect of the objective purpose prong, a measure that has historically
served punitive purposes will be recognized as punishment unless the text
or legislative history of the measure shows a contrary, remedial
purpose.163
The appellants argued that the dissemination of information beyond
law enforcement personnel, which is required in situations involving Tier
2 and Tier 3 registrants, is "closely analogous" to the punishments of pub-
lic shaming, humiliation and banishment as practiced in colonial
America.164 The Third Circuit noted that it addressed a similar argument
For the Tier 1 registrants, who comprise over 45% of the total number of those
required to register, the dissemination of information is limited to law enforce-
ment personnel. See id. For the Tier 2 registrants, who comprise about 50% of
those required to register, the notification is limited to members of the community
who have responsibility for, or provide support to, those who are most likely to be
victimized if the registrant reoffends. See id. Finally, even for the sex offenders
who are determined to pose the greatest risk and are classified as Tier 3 regis-
trants, who comprise about 5% of the total number of registrants, information is
only disseminated to those who are "reasonably certain" to encounter the regis-
trant. See id.
158. See id. The information disseminated for registrants officially classified
as either Tier 2 or Tier 3 sex offenders includes the following: name, description,
recent photograph, address, place of employment or schooling and a description
of any vehicle used by the registrant along with the license plate number. See id.
159. See id. at 1098-99.
160. See id. at 1099.
161. See id. (noting that tailoring individual notification plans for each regis-
trant would unnecessarily expend great amount of resources).
162. See id.
163. SeeArtwayv. Attorney General, 81 F.3d 1235, 1257 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 619 (1993)).
164. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1099; see also Feldman, supra note 9, at 1094-97 (dis-
cussing historical approach with respect to sex offender registration and notifica-
tion legislation); Gibeaut, supra note 4, at 36 (stating that some courts have found
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34
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol43/iss3/2
in United States v. Criden,1 65 in which it rejected a tendered analogy com-
paring the media rebroadcast of material placed into evidence at a crimi-
nal trial with the shaming punishments of colonial America.
166
sex offender notification provisions to be "a modern-day version of the scarlet let-
ter, that badge of humiliation pinned on adulterers in colonial America"); Jon A.
Brilliant, Note, The Modern Day Scarlet Letter: A Critical Analysis of Modern Probation
Conditions, 1989 DusE L.J. 1357, 1360-62 (1989) (discussing historical analogues to
modern probation conditions and stating that public humiliation, or stigmatiza-
tion, played major role in punishment for early American societies).
A similar argument, also based on historical analogues, was made by the plain-
tiff in Artway. See Artway, 81 F.3d at 1265. Specifically, Alexander Artway, a con-
victed sex offender required to register with local law enforcement authorities
under Megan's Law, argued that the registration provisions of Megan's Law were
analogous to the Scarlet Letter of literary fame. See id. See generally NATHANIEL
HAWTHORNE, THE SCAILET LETTER (1950). Artway contended that registration
under Megan's Law, like the scarlet letter, results in "public ostracism and oppro-
brium." Artway, 81 F.3d at 1265. Artway further argued that Megan's Law, in a
similar manner as the scarlet letter, would subject him to potential vigilantism,
hinder his employment opportunities and impair his ability to develop and main-
tain stable interpersonal relationships. See id.
The Third Circuit rejected Artway's proposed analogy, concluding that the
registration provisions of Megan's Law bear "little resemblance to the Scarlet Let-
ter." Id. The court noted that the registration provisions of Megan's Law merely
require certain sex offenders to provide a package of information to local law en-
forcement authorities. See id. According to the court, the primary distinction be-
tween registration under Megan's Law and the scarlet letter is that registration
does not involve public notification. See id. The court stated that "[w]ithout this
public element, [the plaintiffs] analogy fails." Id. The court observed that the
scarlet letter, in addition to the other shaming punishments of colonial America,
relied on the disgrace of an individual before the community. See id. According to
the court, however, registration can not be reasonably compared to public humili-
ation because the entities that would have access to a registrant's information (i.e.,
local law enforcement authorities) would constitute only a "de minimis" portion of
the registrant's community. See id. Based on the foregoing historical analysis, the
Third Circuit concluded that the registration requirements of Megan's Law do not
constitute punishment. See id. at 1267.
165. 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981).
166. See id. at 825. The district court in Criden made the following
observation:
The greater and more widespread the publicity about a particular crimi-
nal case, the more likely it is that penalties not prescribed by the law will
be visited upon the accused and, more importantly, upon innocent rela-
tives and friends ....
Given the nature of our society these side effects are inevitable; in-
deed, it can be argued that they form an important, if unofficial, part of
the sanctions imposed by society upon lawbreakers. The unfortunate fact
is, however, that these side effects are not uniformly visited upon persons
accused of violating the law. And, since they are not an official part of
the criminal justice process, and are beyond the reach of that process,
there is probably no acceptable way of ensuring uniformity of application.
United States v. Criden, 501 F. Supp. 854, 860 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 648 F.2d 814
(3d Cir. 1981).
The Third Circuit concluded that the media rebroadcast of evidentiary mate-
rial did not subject the defendants to public ridicule and shame. See Criden, 648
F.2d at 825 ("In this case, particularly, when the defendants themselves were public
figures and their conduct was already the subject of national publicity and com-
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In addition to relying on the analysis and rationales set forth in
Criden, the Third Circuit delineated distinctions between community noti-
fication under Megan's Law and the shaming punishments of colonial
America.16 7 Specifically, the court noted that the colonial practices of
public shaming, humiliation and banishment all involved more than sim-
ply disseminating information.1 68 Rather, the colonial practices to which
appellants referred inflicted punishment because they either physically
shamed the wrongdoer before his or her fellow citizens or physically re-
moved the wrongdoer from the community.169 Furthermore, the court
noted that from a historical viewpoint, the dissemination of information
about criminal activity has always held the potential for considerable nega-
tive consequences for the individuals involved in the activity, but such dis-
semination of information, however, has never been considered
punishment when done to further a legitimate governmental interest. 170
Finally, the court noted that when there is probable cause to believe that
an individual has engaged in criminal behavior, the law has always de-
manded public proceedings, including public indictment, public trial and
public sentencing.1 71 These public proceedings, according to the court,
naturally include the dissemination of information about the accused. 172
Rather than viewing this public dissemination of information as punish-
ment, as the appellants contended, the Third Circuit noted that it insists
on public dissemination because it heightens public respect for the judi-
cial process, allows the public to "check" the power of the judiciary and
plays an important role in the unhindered discussion of governmental
activities. 173
Additionally, the Third Circuit adopted the appellees' view regarding
the appropriate historical analysis of community notification.1 74 Specifi-
ment, we find the.., concerns about the incremental effect of rebroadcast public-
ity to be unconvincing."). Accordingly, the court held that the enhanced publicity
resulting from the media rebroadcast was not severe enough to constitute punish-
ment. See id.
167. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1099 (rejecting appellants' argument that dissemina-
tion of information is closely analogous to shaming punishments of colonial
America).
168. See id. (noting also that dissemination of information by state regarding
crime and its perpetrators was unnecessary in colonial times because everyone in
colonial settlement would have known such information).
169. See id.
170. See id. With respect to the dissemination of information to the commu-
nity regarding criminal activity, the court conclusively stated that the
"[d]issemination of such information in and of itself, however, has never been
regarded as punishment when done in furtherance of a legitimate governmental
interest." Id. at 1099-1100.
171. See id. at 1100.
172. See id.
173. See id. (citing Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d
Cir. 1984)).
174. See id. at 1100-01. The appellees argued that community notification is
comparable to state warnings regarding threats to public safety. See id.
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cally, the appellees contended that instead of comparing community noti-
fication under Megan's Law to the shaming punishments of colonial
America, the more apt comparison would be between community notifica-
tion under Megan's Law and state warnings regarding threats to public
safety. 175 Accordingly, the court compared community notification under
Megan's Law with quarantine notices, which pertain to dangerous health-
related matters, and "warning" posters, which notify the public that a pic-
tured individual represents a danger to the community.
176
The court further noted that whenever these state-sanctioned warn-
ings are based on a specific risk posed by a particular individual, that indi-
vidual can expect to experience embarrassment and isolation.
177
Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that states are entitled to issue such
175. See id. (noting that to provide members of public with opportunity to
protect themselves, state governments have traditionally published appropriate
warnings about range of public hazards).
176. See id. at 1101. In addition to situations involving dangerous individuals
and highly contagious illnesses, there are other situations that the New Jersey Leg-
islature has determined to be serious enough to warrant public notice. See id. at
1101 n.22. For example, there is a New Jersey statute requiring that the public be
given notice when an adult inmate is being considered for parole. See N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 30:4-123.48g (West 1995). Specifically, the statute provides that "[t]he [Pa-
role B]oard shall give public notice prior to considering any adult inmate for re-
lease." Id. A related New Jersey statute specifically defines "public notice":
"Public notice" shall consist of lists including names of all inmates being
considered for parole, the county from which he [or she] was committed
and the crime for which he [or she] was incarcerated. At least 30 days
prior to parole consideration such lists shall be forwarded to the prosecu-
tor's office of each county, the sentencing court, the office of the Attor-
ney General, any other criminal justice agencies whose information and
comment may be relevant, and news organizations.
Id. § 30:4-123.45b(5). There is also a New Jersey statute requiring that victims be
given notice when a defendant is released from incarceration. See N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 52:4B-44b(21) (West 1995). Specifically, the statute provides in relevant part:
b. The standards [to insure rights of crime victims] shall require that the
Office of Victim-Witness Advocacy in the Division of Criminal Justice and
each county prosecutor's office provide the following services upon re-
quest for victims and witnesses involved in the prosecution of a case:
(21) Notification to the victim of the defendant's release from cus-
tody which shall include:
(a) notice of the defendant's escape from custody and return to cus-
tody following escape;
(b) notice of any other release from custody, including placement in
an Intensive Supervision Program or other alternative disposition,
and any associated conditions of release;
(c) notice of the filing by an inmate of an application for commuta-
tion of sentence pursuant to [relevant statute] and its disposition;
(d) notice of parole consideration pursuant to provisions of [rele-
vant statute]; and
(e) notice of the pending release of an inmate due to expiration of
sentence ....
Id.
177. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1101 (recognizing negative effects of state-sanc-
tioned warnings).
37
DeMatteo: Welcome to Anytown, U.S.A. - Home of Beautiful Scenery (and a Con
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
warnings and that the adverse consequences that accompany the warnings
do not constitute punishment.1 78 Accordingly, after demonstrating that
courts have traditionally not regarded the closest historical analogues as
punishment, the Third Circuit concluded that historical precedent does
not demonstrate that community notification under Megan's Law has an
objective punitive purpose. 179
c. Mixed Salutary and Deterrent Effects
The Third Circuit recognized that some statutory measures are in-
tended to have two purposes, a salutary purpose and a deterrent pur-
pose.1 80 Under this final hurdle of the objective purpose prong, the court
noted that such "mixed measures" will not be deemed punitive, despite
their deterrent purpose, unless: (1) the measure's deterrent purpose is an
unnecessary complement to its salutary purpose; (2) the measure is oper-
ating in a manner that is inconsistent with its historically mixed purposes;
or (3) the deterrent purpose overwhelms the salutary purpose. 18 1 The
Third Circuit interpreted this aspect of the objective purpose prong as a
'savings provision" because a challenged measure that has punitive or de-
terrent purposes that can not be fully justified by its remedial or salutary
purposes will nonetheless be declared nonpunitive if similar measures
have traditionally served both salutary and deterrent purposes. 182 Accord-
ing to the court, however, because of its finding that the remedial purpose
of Megan's Law justifies all of its components, an analysis under this third
aspect of the objective purpose prong does not lead to the conclusion that
Megan's Law is punitive.1 83
178. See id.; see also 134 CONG. Rxc. 16,008 (1988) (statement of Sen. Strom
Thurmond) (stating that state governments have authority to issue warning posters
to protect health and safety of its citizens).
179. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1101.
180. See id. at 1101 (noting that some laws have more than one discernible
purpose). Specifically, the court noted that "some measures are intended to have
a mixed salutary and deterrent effect." Id. at 1093.
In Artway v. Attorney General, the court provided examples of legislative meas-
ures that have both salutary and deterrent effects. See Artway v. Attorney General,
81 F.3d 1235, 1258-59 (3d Cir. 1996). The Third Circuit defined "salutary" as in-
cluding "both remedial and otherwise beneficial goals." Id. at 1259 n.23. The
Artway court noted that taxes on illegal activities and taxes on activities that the
state wants to discourage are examples of measures that have mixed salutary and
deterrent effects. See id. at 1259. For example, the court noted that "mixed-mo-
tive" taxes, such as the taxes that are imposed on the sale of cigarettes, do not
constitute "punishment" because the government wants the activity to continue "to
the extent that its benefits-including tax revenues-outweigh its harms." Id.
181. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1093 (discussing evaluation of legislative measures
that have both salutary and deterrent effects); see also Artway, 81 F.3d at 1263
(same).
182. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1101 (interpreting third aspect of objective purpose
prong of Artway framework).
183. See id.
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3. Effects
Under the final prong of the Artway framework, the court examined
the effects, both direct and indirect, of community notification pursuant
to Megan's Law.184 In Artway, the Third Circuit noted that an otherwise
nonpunitive measure could inflict unconstitutional punishment if its ef-
fects were sufficiently harsh.1 85 For the effects of an otherwise nonpuni-
tive law to render it punishment, however, the Third Circuit stated that
those effects must be "extremely onerous.
" 186
184. See id. at 1093 (noting that final prong of Artway framework requires
court to examine scope and severity of direct and indirect effects of challenged
legislative measure).
185. See Artway, 81 F.3d at 1260 (noting that judicial determination of
whether challenged legislative measure impermissibly inflicts unconstitutional
punishment is based on evaluation of challenged measure's direct and indirect
effects); see also United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989) ("[A] civil as well
as a criminal sanction constitutes punishment when the sanction as applied in the
individual case serves the goals of punishment.").
In reaching its conclusion, the Artway court relied on the Supreme Court's
recent decision in California Department of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499
(1995). See Artway, 81 F.3d at 1260-61 (discussing Supreme Court's decision in
Morales). In Morales, the Supreme Court rejected the respondent's ex post facto
challenge to a California statute that decreased a prisoner's right to parole eligibil-
ity hearings. See Morales, 514 U.S. at 501-02. Prior to the enactment of the chal-
lenged statute and under the law that was in effect at the time the respondent
committed the crime, the respondent would have been entitled to parole suitabil-
ity hearings every year after the initial parole determination. See id. at 503. Under
the challenged statute, the parole review board was authorized to defer subsequent
parole suitability hearings under certain specified conditions. See id. In deciding
this case, the Supreme Court framed the issue as whether the statute increased the
punishment attached to the respondent's crime. See id. at 505. The Supreme
Court held that the effects on the respondent were not great enough to warrant a
finding that the challenged statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. See id. at 514.
According to the Third Circuit in Artway, the Morales Court contributed two
elements to the "punishment" analysis. See Artway, 81 F.3d at 1260. First, Morales
shifted the judicial focus from a law's purpose to its effects. See id. Specifically,
Morales made it clear that a law can be considered unconstitutional punishment
solely because of the harshness and severity of its effects. See id. Second, Morales
established that the "appropriate 'punishment' analysis is flexible and context-de-
pendent." Id. After analyzing the Supreme Court's decision in Morales, the Artway
court stated that "[w]hile even a substantial 'sting' will not render a measure 'pun-
ishment,' at some level the 'sting' will be so sharp that it can only be considered
punishment regardless of the legislators' subjective thoughts." Id. at 1261 (cita-
tions omitted).
186. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1101. The court noted that an analysis of the effects
prong of the Artway framework involves "difficult line-drawing." Id. at 1093. While
searching for guidance in this unenviable task, the court examined a few Supreme
Court cases that provide relatively fixed, although somewhat conflicting, points at
which the line can be drawn. See id. After reviewing the relevant Supreme Court
case law, the court noted that the only clear examples of "sufficiently onerous"
effects are deprivation of one's United States citizenship and incarceration. See id.
at 1101 (noting that case law suggests that these two deprivations can constitute
"sufficiently onerous" effects); see also Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 435-36 (1987)
(holding that effect of incarceration can be severe enough to require finding of
unconstitutional punishment when challenged on ex post facto grounds); Trop v.
1998] NOTE 619
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The Third Circuit began its analysis by looking at the direct effects of
community notification pursuant to Megan's Law.187 The court conclu-
sively stated that the direct effects of community notification "clearly do
not rise to the level of extremely onerous" so as to compel the court to
conclude that the application of Megan's Law constitutes punishment. 188
Specifically, the court noted that by enacting Megan's Law, which only
mandates registration and notification, the state did not impose any direct
restrictions on a registrant's ability to live and work in a community. 189
The next step in the court's analysis involved an examination of the
indirect effects of community notification pursuant to Megan's Law.190
While the court conceded that the indirect effects of Tier 2 and Tier 3
notification on the registrants and their families are harsh, these effects
were not sufficiently burdensome so as to require the classification of the
law as punitive. 19 1 In its analysis, the court identified and discussed two
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 98-99 (1958) (holding that effect of forfeiture of one's United
States citizenship can be sufficiently severe so as to require finding of
punishment).
Even these deprivations, however, do not invariably constitute per se punish-
ment. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1101. For example, the Supreme Court has also held
that incarceration by itself does not necessarily constitute punishment. See Kansas
v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2083, 2086 (1997) (noting that mere fact individual
is detained does not inexorably lead to conclusion that government has imposed
punishment and holding that post sentence, involuntary civil commitment of sexu-
ally violent predators does not constitute unconstitutional punishment); United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746, 755 (1987) (holding that pre-trial detention of
dangerous offenders does not constitute punishment). In addition, the Supreme
Court has held that the effects of the deprivation of one's livelihood are not so
onerous that a finding of punishment is required. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363
U.S. 603, 616-17 (1960) (holding that effects of termination of social security bene-
fits are not sufficiently onerous and therefore do not constitute punishment);
Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 196 (1898) (holding that revocation of license
to practice one's profession is not punishment).
187. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1102.
188. See id. (providing examples of "extremely onerous" effects and conclud-
ing that community notification pursuant to Megan's Law does not result in such
effects).
189. See id. (stating specifically that "state has imposed no restrictions on a
registrant's ability to live and work in a community, to move from place to place, to
obtain a professional license or to secure governmental benefits").
190. See id. at 1102-05. The court noted that the registrants were more con-
cerned with the indirect effects than the direct effects of Megan's Law. See id. at
1102. The court also noted that the indirect effects of Megan's Law include
"[a]ctions that members of the community may take as a result of learning of the
registrant's past, his [or her] potential danger, and his [or her] presence in the
community." Id.
191. See id. at 1105. The court discussed numerous documented examples of
the types of indirect effects that registrants and their families have experienced.
See id. at 1102. First, registrants and their families have experienced extreme
humiliation, embarrassment and isolation as a result of community notification
pursuant to Megan's Law. See id. Second, employment and employment opportu-
nities have either been jeopardized or lost as a result of community notification.
See id.; see also Robert C. Gottlieb, Cops Are Taking New Law Too Far, NEWSDAY, Oct.
8, 1997, at A47 (stating that community notification has numerous detrimental
[Vol. 43: p. 581
40
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol43/iss3/2
indirect effects that often result from community notification: (1) injury to
what is often denoted as reputational interests and (2) exposure to an
increased risk of private violence that can result in property damage or
personal injury.1 92
The court first examined the effects of community notification on the
reputational interests of the registrants, noting that society has tradition-
ally regarded reputational interests and injuries to those interests as very
serious.193 At the same time, however, the court recognized that reputa-
tional interests have traditionally not received the same degree of protec-
tion as other fundamental interests, such as the constitutionally-secured
right to privacy.19 4 Additionally, the Third Circuit noted that the reputa-
effects on individual, including loss of employment). Third, housing opportuni-
ties have been jeopardized or lost. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1102. Fourth, interper-
sonal relationships with family members and friends have been strained or
destroyed. See id.
Of particular concern, however, is the threat of physical violence. See id. The
court noted that those individuals subject to the Tier 2 and Tier 3 notification
requirements of Megan's Law have occasionally been exposed to violence. See id.
The court further noted that while incidents of "vigilante justice" are not common,
the incidents have happened "with sufficient frequency and publicity" to result in a
justifiable fear on the part of the registrants. Id. Recent commentators noted that
"vigilantism" is a major problem that results from the release of information to the
public at large. See Hacking, supra note 2, at 804 (providing examples of violence
that resulted after community was notified pursuant to Megan's Law); Gottlieb,
supra, at A47 (emphasizing that community notification has resulted in threats of
physical violence, physical attacks and arson). In one instance, citizens of the local
community burned down the home of a convicted rapist on the day he was to
move into the community. See Hacking, supra note 2, at 804. In another example,
two individuals broke into a house and beat the occupant, who was staying in the
same residence as a registered sex offender. See id.; see also Jenny A. Montana,
Note, An Ineffective Weapon in the Fight Against Child Sexual Abuse: New Jersey's Megan 's
Law, 3J.L. & POL. 569, 577-80 (1995) (asserting that community notification pur-
suant to Megan's Law encourages lawlessness among citizenry).
192. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1102-05.
193. See id. at 1102-04. The court emphasized that our law has traditionally
sought to protect reputational interests and provide compensation for wrongful
injuries to those interests. See id. at 1102. According to the court, legislatures orig-
inally designed the law of defamation to provide a legal remedy for individuals
whose reputations are injured by spurious allegations of criminal conduct. See id.
194. See id.; see also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-13 (1976) (rejecting argu-
ment that reputational interests are fundamental and concluding that they do not
come within right of privacy created by United States Constitution); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (noting that only personal rights that can be deemed
"fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" are included in con-
stitutional guarantee of personal privacy).
In Davis, local law enforcement authorities decided to alert area businesses to
the threat of shoplifters who might be operating during the Christmas season. See
Davis, 424 U.S. at 694-95. To provide notice to the area merchants regarding the
threat of potential shoplifters, local officials distributed 800 "flyers" containing the
name and "mug shot" photo of individuals recently arrested for shoplifting. See id.
at 695. Davis, who was recently arrested but not convicted for shoplifting, was in-
cluded on the flyer. See id. at 695-96. Subsequently, Davis brought a civil rights
action against the law enforcement officials in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Kentucky. See id. at 696. Specifically, Davis alleged that the
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tional interests asserted by the appellants are very different from the inter-
ests that are traditionally viewed as "fundamental." 195 Accordingly, the
court held that the effects of community notification on the registrants'
reputational interests do not implicate any interest that is of fundamental
constitutional magnitude and, consequently, the impact of community no-
tification is insufficient to constitute punishment. 196
Next, the court examined the second category of indirect effects that
may result from community notification-exposure to an increased risk of
violence. 19 7 While the court conceded that registrants are exposed to an
increased risk of violence as a result of community notification, it ulti-
mately concluded that the risk is not of such magnitude as to compel the
conclusion that community notification constitutes punishment.19 8 The
court recognized that when a person commits an egregious crime and is
subject to public prosecution, the risk of retributive violence is aug-
officials destroyed his reputation by distributing the flyers and, by doing so, they
violated his constitutionally-secured right to privacy. See id.
The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss Davis's com-
plaint, holding that the facts did not establish that the officials deprived Davis of
any right guaranteed by the United States Constitution. See id. Upon the dismissal
of his complaint, Davis appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, which concluded that Davis set forth a viable civil rights claim be-
cause he alleged facts that constituted a denial of due process of law. See id. at 696-
97. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and concluded that Davis's reputa-
tional interest was not sufficiently fundamental so as to invoke the procedural pro-
tections of the Due Process Clause or to come within the constitutionally-secured
right to personal privacy. See id. at 712-13. The Court stated that "the interest in
reputation asserted in this case is neither 'liberty' nor 'property' guaranteed
against state deprivation without due process of law." Id. at 712.
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Roe emphasized that the United States Consti-
tution does not explicitly mention any right to privacy. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
The Court noted, however, that throughout its decisions, it has recognized that a
right of personal privacy does exist under the Constitution. See id.
195. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1103. The court noted that the judiciary has tradi-
tionally viewed interests related to marriage, procreation and child rearing as "fun-
damental." See id. (citing Department ofJustice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom
of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 749 (1989) (discussing background of case addressing
issue of whether there is right to privacy in Federal Bureau of Investigation "rap"
sheets)).
196. See id. at 1103-04.
197. See id. at 1104-05.
198. See id. at 1104. The court noted that even though there are documented
incidents in which community notification has resulted in personal injury and
property damage, these occurrences are relatively rare. See id. Of the 135 notifica-
tions completed in New Jersey for which there is data, there were only two inci-
dents serious enough to warrant a report to law enforcement authorities. See id.;
see also Hacking, supra note 2, at 804 (citing examples of vigilantism resulting from
sex offender registration and subsequent community notification); Montana, supra
note 191, at 577-80 (asserting that community notification pursuant to Megan's
Law and similar sex offender legislation encourages lawlessness among citizenry);
Gottlieb, supra note 191, at A47 (discussing increased risk of physical violence that
results from community notification).
[Vol. 43: p. 581
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mented. 199 The court further recognized that the duration of the aug-
mented risk is probably extended as a result of community notification
pursuant to Megan's Law.20 0 Nevertheless, the court concluded that this
augmented risk of personal violence is not so "sufficiently burdensome"
that it requires community notification under Megan's Law be considered
punishment. 2 ° 1
B. Satisfaction of the Artway Framework
After completing its constitutional analysis of the challenged provi-
sions of Megan's Law, the court concluded that the Tier 2 and Tier 3 noti-
fication provisions of Megan's Law satisfy each of the three prongs of the
Artway framework.20 2 Accordingly, the Third Circuit held that the com-
munity notification required by Megan's Law does not impermissibly in-
flict punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy
Clauses of the United States Constitution.2 03
In a concurring and dissenting opinion,Judge Becker agreed with the
appellants that community notification under Megan's Law is analogous
to the shaming punishments of colonial America, which were "indubitably
and unabashedly punitive. '20 4 In addition, Judge Becker noted that noth-
199. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1104.
200. See id.
201. See id. After reaching its conclusion regarding the increased risk of phys-
ical violence that may result from community notification pursuant to Megan's
Law, the Third Circuit stated its belief that the Supreme Court would also view this
indirect effect of Megan's Law as not sufficiently burdensome to require that
Megan's Law be classified as punitive. See id. at 1105.
202. See id. (concluding that community notification pursuant to Megan's
Law satisfies all three prongs of Artway framework and, therefore, does not consti-
tute punishment).
203. See id. While the Third Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the com-
munity notification provisions of Megan's Law as applied to Tier 2 and Tier 3
registrants, it reversed the district court on procedural due process grounds. See id.
at 1111. The Third Circuit held that the application of the community notification
provisions of Megan's Law to the class certified by the district court, Tier 2 and
Tier 3 registrants, would not violate the Ex Post Facto or Double Jeopardy Clauses.
See id. The Third Circuit also held, however, that the Due Process Clause would be
violated by any Tier 2 or Tier 3 notification that occurred without first providing
the registrant with an opportunity to challenge the tier classification and commu-
nity notification plan in a hearing in which the prosecutor has the burden of prov-
ing his or her case by clear and convincing evidence. See id. Based on this
conclusion, the Third Circuit reversed and remanded the case with instructions for
the district court "(1) to enter an injunction foreclosing notification in Tier 2 and
Tier 3 cases without compliance with these requirements of procedural due pro-
cess, and (2) to deny any further relief." Id.
204. Id. at 1113 (Becker, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (discussing
similarities between community notification under Megan's Law and shaming pun-
ishments of colonial America).
Although Judge Becker disagreed with the majority's constitutional analysis
under the Artway framework, he agreed with the majority's rulings on some of the
other issues. See id. at 1112-13 (Becker, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Specifically, Judge Becker agreed with the majority's conclusion that Artway pro-
1998] NOTE
43
DeMatteo: Welcome to Anytown, U.S.A. - Home of Beautiful Scenery (and a Con
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43: p. 581
ing in the design or operation of Megan's Law contradicts this historical
understanding. 20 5 Accordingly, Judge Becker concluded that because the
history of notification evidences a punitive intent and because the design
and operation of Megan's Law do not negate the punitive intent, commu-
nity notification under Megan's Law should be considered punishment
according to the second prong of the Artway framework.
2 6
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Third Circuit addressed the issue of whether community notifica-
tion under Megan's Law violates the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy
Clauses of the United States Constitution. 20 7 The court properly con-
cluded that the analytical framework developed in Artway provides the ap-
propriate legal standard for determining whether community notification
under Megan's Law constitutes punishment.20 8 The Third Circuit, how-
ever, improperly concluded that community notification under Megan's
Law does not inflict punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto and
vides the appropriate legal standard for determining if a challenged legislative
measure impermissibly inflicts punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto and
Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States Constitution, even after the
Supreme Court's recent decisions in United States v. Ursery and Kansas v. Hendricks.
See id. at 1112 (Becker, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judge Becker
also agreed with the majority that the "Rooker-Feldman" doctrine effectively pre-
cludes the Third Circuit from reviewing E.B.'s challenge. See id. at 1113 (Becker,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Furthermore,Judge Becker agreed with
the majority that the Due Process Clause prohibits imposing the burden of persua-
sion at a Megan's Law tier classification hearing on the sex offender. See id.
(Becker, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Finally, Judge Becker agreed
that the prosecutor's burden of proof at a Megan's Law tier classification hearing
must be met by clear and convincing evidence. See id. (Becker, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
205. See id. (Becker, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judge Becker
noted that the design of the community notification provisions of Megan's Law
does not negate the understanding that society has traditionally viewed community
notification as punishment. See id. at 1122 (Becker, J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part). Similarly, Judge Becker noted that the operation of Megan's Law,
particularly the community notification provisions, does not contradict the histori-
cal understanding of the measure as punitive. See id. (Becker, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
206. See id. at 1113 (Becker, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judge
Becker noted that the failure to satisfy the second prong of the Artway framework,
objective purpose, is necessarily fatal to the constitutionality of the community no-
tification provisions of Megan's Law. See id. (Becker,J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part).
207. See id. at 1105 (holding that community notification required by Megan's
Law does not impermissibly inflict punishment in violation of Ex Post Facto and
Double Jeopardy Clauses).
208. See id. at 1093-96 (concluding that analytical framework developed in
Artway remains appropriate legal standard, despite two recent Supreme Court deci-
sions, for determining if challenged legislative measure constitutes unconstitu-
tional punishment).
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Double Jeopardy Clauses. 20 9 According to the second prong of the Artway
framework, if an historical analysis indicates that society has traditionally
regarded the challenged measure as punishment and if the text of the
measure does not negate the punitive intent, the measure must be consid-
ered punishment.2 10 Therefore, because a proper historical analysis indi-
cates that society has traditionally regarded community notification as
punishment and because the text of Megan's Law does not negate this
traditional understanding, community notification under Megan's Law
should be considered punishment according to the second prong of the
Artway framework. 21 1
A. Historical Analysis Indicates that Community Notification Pursuant to
Megan's Law Evidences a Punitive Intent
A proper analysis of historical analogues that are comparable to com-
munity notification under Megan's Law reveals that society has tradition-
ally regarded community notification as punishment.2 12 The Third
Circuit, however, deftly avoided the appellants' contention that commu-
nity notification under Megan's Law is comparable to the shaming punish-
ments of colonial America and instead asserted that warning posters and
quarantine notices constitute far more compelling analogies to commu-
nity notification. 21 3 Therefore, the critical inquiry is whether community
209. See April R. Bedarf, Comment, Examining Sex Offender Community Notifica-
tion Laws, 83 CAL. L. REv. 885, 913 (1995) ("Even if there were compelling policy
justifications for community notification laws, such laws are probably unconstitu-
tional."). In addition to arguing that sex offender community notification laws
violate the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses, critics argue that "[t]he
public stigma inflicted by community notification laws may violate the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment." Id.
210. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1113 (discussing relevant inquiry under objective
purpose prong of Artway framework).
211. For a discussion of a proper historical analysis under the second prong
of the Artway framework, see infra notes 212-46 and accompanying text.
212. See Brilliant, supra note 164, at 1360 ("Early forms of punishment con-
tained a strong element of gross public humiliation; in fact, public humiliation...
functioned as punishment by itself." (footnotes omitted)); see also Courtney Guy-
ton Persons, Sex in the Sunlight: The Effectiveness, Efficiency, Constitutionality, and Ad-
visability of Publishing Names and Pictures of Prostitutes'Patrons, 49 VAND. L. REv. 1525,
1535 (1996) (noting that community notification was major component of sham-
ing punishments and that "shame punishments are directly, pointedly, and consist-
ently aimed at communication to wider society"); Gottlieb, supra note 191, at A47
(noting that community notification "invokes the frightening spirit of 170'-Century
Puritan New England"). A recent commentator noted that the media coverage
that surrounds modern criminal trials and convictions is "the [modern-day] pil-
lory." See Persons, supra, at 1534 (stating that "newspapers often find criminal trials
and convictions to be of public interest . . . and . . the paper becomes the
pillory").
213. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1101 (discussing similarities between community no-
tification pursuant to Megan's Law and governmental warnings about public dan-
gers). With respect to the appellants' argument regarding the similarities between
community notification under Megan's Law and the shaming punishments of colo-
nial America, the court stated:
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notification under Megan's Law is more analogous to the shaming punish-
ments of colonial America, which society has traditionally regarded as pu-
nitive, or warning posters and quarantine notices, which are remedial and
nonpunitive. 2 14 By comparing community notification under Megan's
Law to insufficiently comparable historical analogues, such as warning pos-
ters and quarantine notices, the Third Circuit engaged in a faulty histori-
cal analysis. 215 A better reasoned historical analysis compares community
notification under Megan's Law to the shaming punishments of colonial
We also agree with appellees that various forms of state warnings about
threats to public safety provide more apt analogies to Tier 2 and Tier 3
notification than the referenced colonial practices. In order to provide
members of the public with an opportunity to take steps to protect them-
selves, the government has traditionally published appropriate warnings
about a range of public hazards.
Id. at 1100-01.
The shaming punishments of colonial America took many different forms. See
id. at 1115-16. Traditionally-practiced shaming punishments included admonition,
labeling, branding, maiming, mutilation, banishment, forced sign wearing, con-
finement in stocks, whipping, dunking in water and the wheel. See id.; see also Toni
M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1880,
1881-82 (1991) (discussing shaming punishments of colonial America); Gregory
W. O'Reilly, Illinois Lifts the Veil on Juvenile Conviction Records, ILL. B.J., Aug. 1995, at
402, 403 (discussing shaming punishments of colonial America with respect to leg-
islative release of juvenile records); Persons, supra note 212, at 1533 (discussing
various forms of shaming punishments as practiced in colonial America).
Although some of these punishments also involved a physical component, the au-
thorities often dispensed with the physical aspect of the punishment because the
genuine "sting" of the punishment often resulted solely from the publicity aspect.
See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1116.
The shaming punishment of labeling took two different forms, one temporary
and one permanent. See id. at 1115-16. The temporary version involved having the
offender display a label signifying his offense. See id. at 1115. For example, if an
individual was convicted of adultery, the offender might have been required to
display a letter "A" that was cut from cloth and attached onto his or her outer
garments. See id. at 1115-16. A more permanent labeling approach involved
branding, in which the label was burned directly onto the offender's body. See id.
at 1116. For example, a murderer might have had an "M" branded onto his or
her body, while a thief might have been branded with a "T." See id.; see also Bril-
liant, supra note 164, at 1361 (discussing various forms of colonial American sham-
ing punishments, including branding). In colonial New Jersey, burglars were
often punished by having their hands branded for a first offense and their fore-
heads branded for subsequent offenses. See id. Another shaming punishment was
maiming or mutilation. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1116. One of the more common
forms involved the detachment of the offender's ear. See id. Banishment, or
forced exclusion from the community, was reserved for those individuals who
either presented a permanent risk of danger to the community or engaged in re-
peated acts of criminality. See id.
214. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1116.
215. See id. The court rejected the appellants' proffered analogy comparing
community notification under Megan's Law to the traditionally-practiced shaming
punishments of colonial America. See id. at 1100.
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America, leaving no doubt that the objectively discernible purpose of
Megan's Law is essentially punitive. 2 16
The Third Circuit's analysis contains two major flaws which are neces-
sarily fatal to the court's preferred analogy.2 1 7 First, the court erroneously
concluded that community notification under Megan's Law is more com-
parable to warning posters and quarantine notices because the state
designed each of those measures to alert the community to a risk.2 1 8
While it is admittedly true that community notification, warning posters
and quarantine notices were all designed to alert the community to a risk,
the court overlooked the fact that the shaming punishments of colonial
America were also designed to alert the community to a risk.2 19
216. See Gottlieb, supra note 191, at A47 (noting that community notification
component of sex offender registration and notification laws "invokes the frighten-
ing spirit of 17th-Century Puritan New England"); see also Brilliant, supra note 164,
at 1357-62 (comparing modern day probation conditions to colonial American
shaming punishments).
Many courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States, have relied
on historical analyses in reaching their conclusions. See John Paul Stevens, A
Judge's Use of History, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 223, 225 (1989) (discussing use of history by
judges and noting that judge's task often involves study of past events). While
judicial reliance on history is not a new phenomenon, a review of a few recent
Supreme Court decisions adequately illustrates the integral role that history plays
in our jurisprudence. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1114 (discussing role of historical analy-
sis in four recent Supreme Court decisions). In Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072
(1997), the Supreme Court made use of the historical understanding of a chal-
lenged legislative measure to determine if the measure was punitive. See id. at
2079-80 (tracing history of civil commitment of mentally ill). In Richardson v. Mc-
Knight, 117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997), the Court reviewed the operation of jails in the
nineteenth century to determine if guards employed by private prison manage-
ment firms enjoyed qualified immunity. See id. at 2104-05 (analyzing historical op-
eration of jails as part of decision making process). Similarly, in Washington v.
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997), the Court relied on "over 700 years . . . [of]
Anglo-American common-law tradition" to determine whether assisted suicide is a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution. See id. at 2263 (relying on historical analysis to determine con-
stitutionality of assisted suicide). Recently, in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,
117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997), the Court looked to modern history to distinguish the
Intemet from radio broadcasts. See id. at 2343 (reviewing recent cases dealing with
broadcast regulations). The Court noted that the Internet has no history of lim-
ited First Amendment protections and found provisions of the Communications
Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (to be codified at 47
U.S.C. § 223), to be unconstitutional. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2351. Finally, in Printz
v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997), relying on an analysis of "statutes enacted by
the first Congresses," the Court held that the interim provisions of the Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act are unconstitutional. See id. at 2370, 2384.
217. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1099-1101 (discussing similarities between commu-
nity notification under Megan's Law and warning posters and quarantine notices).
218. See id. at 1117 (discussing majority's comparison of Tier 2 and Tier 3
community notification under Megan's Law to state-sanctioned governmental
warnings regarding potential public hazards).
219. See Adam J. Hirsch, From Pillory to Penitentiary: The Rise of Criminal Incarcer-
ation in Early Massachusetts, 80 MIcH. L. REv. 1179, 1228 (1982) ("Less common,
but equally effective, were branding and mutilation, punishments that fixed upon
the offender an indelible 'mark of infamy,' to warn community members to keep
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The second major flaw in the court's analysis pertains to what the
court did not address. The court ignored two important similarities be-
tween community notification under Megan's Law and the shaming pun-
ishments of colonial America which, if addressed, would demonstrate that
community notification is more similar to the shaming punishments than
to the remedial measures of warning posters and quarantine notices.
First, while attempting to draw a distinction between community notifica-
tion and the shaming punishments, the court inadvertently illuminated a
striking similarity when it noted that the "sting" of community notification
results from the dissemination of accurate information about the regis-
trant's past criminal activity and potential future risk.2 20 Thus, the court
overlooked the fact that shaming punishments were effective precisely be-
cause the punishment involved the dissemination of accurate information
regarding the offender's past criminal activity and potential future risk. 22 1
Second, the court ignored the fact that the type of information dis-
seminated pursuant to community notification under Megan's Law is the
same type of information that the state disseminated in carrying out the
shaming punishments. 22 2 By contrast, warning posters and quarantine no-
tices do not disseminate the same type of information. 223 Warning posters
do not provide information regarding the location of the individual,
which is a key component of Megan's Law notification, and quarantine
notices are limited to health-related information, which generally does not
contain a culpability component.2 24
In addition to the Third Circuit's misplaced reliance on insufficiently
comparable historical analogues, the Third Circuit's reliance on United
their distance."); Massaro, supra note 213, at 1913 ("Branding and maiming also
were designed in part to prevent the offender from committing future similar acts
.. by warning future victims of their criminal propensities ...." (footnotes omit-
ted)); see also E.B., 119 F.3d at 1117 (noting that one important purpose of colonial
American shaming punishments was to alert community to potential risk posed by
offender).
220. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1099 (noting that effect of community notification
pursuant to Megan's Law results from dissemination of accurate information about
registrant).
221. See id. at 1116 (Becker, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting
that in colonial America, publicity of offense was cause of shame and "sting" of
shaming punishments); see also Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?,
63 U. CHI. L. REv. 591, 630-49 (1996) (arguing that dissemination of information
in shaming punishments expressed society's disapproval of crimes).
222. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1118 (Becker, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
223. See id. (BeckerJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (comparing and
contrasting type of information disseminated pursuant to Megan's Law community
notification with type of information disseminated by warning posters and quaran-
tine notices).
224. See id. (Becker, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (drawing dis-
tinction between information disseminated by warning posters and quarantine no-
tices and information disseminated pursuant to community notification under
Megan's Law).
[Vol. 43: p. 581
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States v. Criden was similarly misplaced. 225 In Criden, the Third Circuit re-
jected a tendered analogy between the media rebroadcast of evidentiary
material from a criminal trial and the shaming punishments of colonial
America. 226 The E.B. court found substantial similarities between the
challenged rebroadcast at issue in Criden and the challenged community
notification provisions of Megan's Law.22 7 The E.B. court reasoned that
because the challenged rebroadcast was determined to be unlike the
shaming punishments, the challenged community notification provisions
must also be unlike the shaming punishments. 2 28 The court's reliance on
Criden, however, was necessarily misplaced because the community notifi-
cation provisions of Megan's Law differ from the challenged rebroadcast
in one major respect. Specifically, the private media was responsible for
rebroadcasting the evidentiary material at issue in Criden, whereas the state
is responsible for carrying out community notification pursuant to
Megan's Law.2 29 Because a private entity rebroadcasted the material, the
Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses are not implicated.23 0 The Ex
Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses are only implicated if the state has
impermissibly inflicted punishment. 231 Therefore, Criden does not pro-
vide appropriate jurisprudential precedent for the Third Circuit to rely on
when evaluating ex post facto and double jeopardy claims. In addition,
the fact that Megan's Law is a state-run program bolsters the appellants'
argument that Megan's Law should be compared to shaming punish-
ments, which were also state-run programs.
23 2
B. The Text of Megan's Law Does Not Negate the Punitive Intent of the
Community Notification Provisions
Although the community notification provisions of Megan's Law evi-
dence a punitive intent, the law will nevertheless be declared constitu-
tional for purposes of the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses if
225. See United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981). For a discussion
of Criden, see supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
226. See Criden, 648 F.2d at 825.
227. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1099 (comparing challenged rebroadcast at issue in
Criden to community notification under Megan's Law).
228. See id.
229. See id. at 1115 (noting that private media rebroadcasted evidentiary mate-
rial at issue in Criden, whereas state provides community notification pursuant to
Megan's Law).
230. For a discussion of the Ex Post Facto Clause, see supra notes 46-61 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the Double Jeopardy Clause, see supra
notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
231. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (stating that "[n]o state shall ... pass any
... ex post facto law .... ) (emphasis added).
232. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1119 (Becker, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) (recognizing that shaming punishments of colonial America, in similar man-
ner as community notification pursuant to Megan's Law, were judicially endorsed
and carried out by state).
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the text of the law negates the punitive intent.233 A proper examination
of the statutory design and operation of Megan's Law, however, does not
negate the punitive intent of the community notification provisions. The
pertinent inquiry in this analysis is whether the statute is designed, or func-
tions, in such a manner as to contradict the previously-established punitive
intent.234 Because of the legislative placement of Megan's Law and the
aims which it promotes, it must be concluded that the statutory design and
operation of the community notification provisions of Megan's Law do not
negate the punitive intent.
Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of the statutory design of
Megan's Law is the legislative placement of Megan's Law within the crimi-
nal justice system. 235 The registration and notification provisions of
Megan's Law are contained in Chapter 7 of the NewJersey Code of Crimi-
nal Justice. 236 Moreover, pursuant to the statutory requirements of
Megan's Law, the NewJersey Attorney General, a law enforcement officer,
is responsible for promulgating the guidelines and procedures for the
community notification required by Megan's Law. 237 Additionally, the
guidelines are implemented by the county prosecutors.238 Finally, law en-
forcement officers, either the local police or the state police, provide the
actual notification. 23 9
233. See id. at 1119-22 (Becker, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (ana-
lyzing text, legislative history and statutory design of community notification provi-
sions of Megan's Law).
234. See id. at 1119-20 (Becker, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (not-
ing that key inquiry is whether New Jersey Legislature designed Megan's Law in
such manner as to contradict historical understanding of community notification
provisions as constituting punishment).
235. See N.J. STAT. ANN. , §§ 2C:7-1 to :7-11 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997). Title
2C of the New Jersey Code is the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice. See id.
236. See id. Chapter 7 of Title 2C is entitled the "Registration and Notification
of Release of Certain Offenders." See id.
237. See id. § 2C:7-8a. Section 2C:7-8a states that "the Attorney General shall
promulgate guidelines and procedures for the notification required pursuant to
the provisions of this act." Id.
238. See id. § 2C:7-8d. Section 2C:7-8d provides, in relevant part:
(1) The county prosecutor of the county where the person was convicted
and the county prosecutor of the county where the registered person will
reside ... shall assess the risk of re-offense by the registered person;
(2) The county prosecutor of the county in which the registered person
will reside .. .shall determine the means of providing notification.
Id.
239. See id. §§ 2C:7-6 to :7-7. Section 2C:7-6 provides in relevant part:
Within 45 days after receiving notification ... that an inmate convicted of
or adjudicated delinquent for a sex offense . . .is to be released from
incarceration and after receipt of registration as required therein, the
chief law enforcement officer of the municipality where the inmate in-
tends to reside shall provide notification in accordance with the provi-
sions of section 3 of this act of that inmate's release to the community. If
the municipality does not have a police force, the Superintendent of
State Police shall provide notification.
Id. § 2C:7-6. Section 2C:7-7 provides in relevant part:
[Vol. 43: p. 581
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In addition to the legislative placement of Megan's Law, the opera-
tion of Megan's Law functions to promote the traditional aims of punish-
ment-retribution and deterrence. 240 The Third Circuit did not dispute
that community notification under Megan's Law inflicts a degree of shame
on the registrant because publicizing information about an offender's
crime and potential future risk invariably leads to shame. 24 Further, the
court agreed that the infliction of shame, whether specifically intended by
Megan's Law or not, effects a degree of retribution on the offender.
2 42
Moreover, this shame will presumably discourage the registrants from en-
gaging in certain prohibited behavior, thereby also providing a deterrent
effect. 243 Indeed, one of the primary reasons that the legislature enacted
Megan's Law was to combat the recidivism problem by deterring sex of-
After receipt of notification and registration... that a person required to
register . . . intends to change his address, the chief law enforcement
officer of the municipality to which the person is relocating shall provide
notification of that relocation to the community pursuant to section 3 of
this act.
If the municipality does not have a police force, the Superintendent
of State Police shall provide notification.
Id. § 2C:7-7.
240. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2082 (1997) (stating that two
primary objectives of criminal punishment are retribution and deterrence);
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989) ("[A] civil as well as a criminal
sanction constitutes punishment when the sanction as applied in the individual
case serves the goals of punishment."); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.
144, 168 (1963) ("[T]he traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deter-
rence .... ); see also Persons, supra note 212, at 1533 (noting that shaming punish-
ments, which often involved community notification component, served as
excellent tools for retribution and deterrence).
In Halper, the Supreme Court addressed the difficulty of determining whether
a challenged legislative measure constitutes unconstitutional punishment. Halper,
490 U.S. at 447-48. The Court made the following observation:
In making this assessment, the labels "criminal" and "civil" are not of par-
amount importance. It is commonly understood that civil proceedings
may advance punitive as well as remedial goals, and, conversely, that both
punitive and remedial goals may be served by criminal penalties. The
notion of punishment, as we commonly understand it, cuts across the
division between the civil and the criminal law, and for the purposes of
assessing whether a given sanction constitutes multiple punishment
barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, we must follow the notion where
it leads. To that end, the determination whether a given civil sanction
constitutes punishment in the relevant sense requires a particularized as-
sessment of the penalty imposed and the purposes that the penalty may
fairly be said to serve.
Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
241. See E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1102 (3d Cir. 1997) (recognizing that
Tier 2 and Tier 3 registrants and their families experience profound humiliation
and isolation as result of reaction of those notified), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1039
(1998).
242. See id. (noting that community notification pursuant to Megan's Law has
also resulted in retribution from private entities).
243. See id. at 1120-21 (stating that there is "no disputing" that shame func-
tions as deterrent).
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fenders from re-offending. 244 It is admittedly true, however, that simply
because a statute has the effect of promoting the traditional aims of pun-
ishment, it does not invariably lead to the conclusion that the purpose of
the statute was to do so. 245 Nevertheless, such an effect suggests that the
design of the particular statute does not explicitly negate the punitive in-
tent, which is a key consideration under the second prong of the Artway
framework. 246
Based on the above analysis, it can reasonably be concluded that the
design and operation of Megan's Law does not negate the previously-es-
tablished punitive intent. Therefore, because the history of community
notification evidences a punitive intent and because the design and opera-
tion of Megan's Law does not negate that punitive intent, community noti-
fication under Megan's Law should be considered punishment according
to the second prong of the Artway framework.
VI. IMPACT
Under a proper constitutional analysis, the Third Circuit should have
held that the Tier 2 and Tier 3 notification provisions of Megan's Law
inflict punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy
Clauses of the United States Constitution. The court should have found
that society has traditionally viewed community notification, of the type
required by Megan's Law, as punishment. Moreover, because the statutory
design and operation of Megan's Law does not negate the punitive intent,
the court should have concluded that the community notification provi-
sions fail the second prong of the Artway framework and, therefore, consti-
tute the impermissible infliction of punishment.
Instead, the court's decision in E.B. will have implications that reach
far beyond an improper analysis of constitutional principles. Given that
legislation similar to Megan's Law is present in all fifty states and in the
federal jurisdiction, other courts will most likely address similar constitu-
tional challenges in the near future. 247 Therefore, because the Ex Post
Facto Clause is the highest "constitutional hurdle" facing any legislation
similar to Megan's Law, the Third Circuit's decision in E.B. will undoubt-
edly provide the basis for other courts to sustain the constitutionality of
these laws. 248 In fact, shortly after the Third Circuit's decision in E.B., the
244. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 (stating legislative findings and declaration).
245. See Artway v. Attorney General, 81 F.3d 1235, 1255 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting
that legislative measure can effectively promote traditional aims and goals of pun-
ishment even when that was not stated legislative purpose of measure).
246. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1120 (discussing importance of punitive intent
under second prong of Artway framework).
247. See Gibeaut, supra note 4, at 36 (stating that all 50 states have enacted
similar legislation and noting that sex offender registration and notification laws
have faced a "barrage of constitutional challenges").
248. See Feldman, supra note 9, at 1120 (discussing ex post facto and other
constitutional challenges to sex offender registration and notification laws). One
commentator has suggested that the Ex Post Facto Clause is the toughest constitu-
[Vol. 43: p. 581
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United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit sustained the consti-
tutionality of Washington's "Megan's Law," relying in part on the Third
Circuit's analysis in E.B.24
9
In addition to providing the basis for other courts to sustain the con-
stitutionality of similar legislation, the Third Circuit's decision will also
have a significant impact on the individuals subject to the community noti-
fication provisions of Megan's Law.2 50 Community notification can result
in isolation, harassment, loss of employment and housing, damage to
property, physical violence and arson.25 1 There are numerous examples
of vigilante attacks following community notification, and continuing noti-
fication may lead to a dramatic increase in such incidents. 2 52
Furthermore, allowing community notification to proceed will have
little impact in preventing sexual abuse, which is a primary objective of
Megan's Law.2 53 First, in more than seventy-five percent of sexual abuse
tional challenge facing any legislation similar to Megan's Law. See id. ("The ex post
facto test is the highest constitutional hurdle facing any similar variation of
Megan's Law."). Accordingly, if it is determined that sex offender registration and
notification laws pass constitutional muster with respect to the Ex Post Facto
Clause, all other constitutional challenges will be easier to overcome. See id.
249. See Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 1997) (sus-
taining constitutionality of Washington community protection law in face of vari-
ous constitutional challenges).
250. For a discussion of the impact of Megan's Law on those required to regis-
ter and their families, see supra notes 184-201 and accompanying text.
251. See, e.g., Gottlieb, supra note 191, at A47 (noting that registered sex of-
fenders have been subjected to public shunning, picketing, press vigils, loss of em-
ployment, eviction, threats of violence, physical attacks and arson as result of
community notification).
252. See Hacking, supra note 2, at 804 (discussing vigilante attacks on those
individuals who made decision to comply with statutorily-mandated registration
under Megan's Law); Gottlieb, supra note 191, at A47 (noting that physical attacks
have resulted from community notification pursuant to sex offender registration
and notification laws); Thomas Zolper, Megan's Law Put on Trial: U.S. Court Panel
Challenges Statute, THE REcoRD (NEW JERSEY), Oct. 22, 1996, at A01 (discussing in-
creased risk of vigilantism resulting from community notification pursuant to sex
offender registration and notification laws).
253. See Freeman-Longo, supra note 22, at 313-14 (discussing efficacy of com-
munity notification of sex offender release and concluding that community notifi-
cation laws will be largely ineffective); Smart, supra note 9, at Al (noting that state
sex offender registration and notification laws may not provide children with pro-
tection intended by legislatures due to statutory requirements regarding classifica-
tion of sex offenders and resulting community notification). In addition to
problems inherent in the sex offender legislation itself, many jurisdictions have
experienced confusion regarding the correct implementation of the laws. See Ste-
phanie Reitz, Confusion Causes Veried Access to Data on Sex Offenders, THE HARTFORD
COURANT, Oct. 10, 1997, at A5 (noting that several Connecticut police chiefs are so
confused by Connecticut's Megan's Law that they are uncertain about how to com-
ply with law); see also Elizabeth Benjamin, Megan's Law: Who'll Know, and How
Much?, TIMES UNION (ALBANY), Oct. 2, 1997, at BI (recognizing that after enact-
ment of sex offender registration and notification laws, law enforcement agencies
often experience confusion regarding correct implementation of law). Recent
commentators noted that after the enactment of sex offender registration and no-
tification laws, various local police agencies acknowledged that they are still con-
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cases, the sexual abuse is perpetrated by someone the victim knows, not a
stranger. 254 In these cases, community notification will have little impact
in preventing further incidents of sexual abuse in the community because
the community itself is not at risk.2 5 5 Second, there is no empirical scien-
tific research to support the effectiveness of sex offender notification
laws. 2 56 Third, the mobility of sex offenders will seriously impair the effec-
tiveness of Megan's Law and similar sex offender legislation. 257 Other
than the statutory mandates, there is nothing to stop a registered sex of-
fender from traveling outside of the notified community to select a
victim. 2
58
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the constitutionality of sex
offender registration and notification laws. Ultimately, however, this issue
may come before the Court for review. 259 With similar legislation enacted
fused about how to put the law into effect. See Reitz, supra, at A5; see also Benjamin,
supra, at BI.
254. See Freeman-Longo, supra note 22, at 313 (discussing inherent problems
with sex offender notification laws and noting that sexual abuse is often perpe-
trated by someone victim knows).
255. See id. at 313-14. A recent commentator noted that denial is another
factor that may impair the effectiveness of community notification laws, especially
when the sexual abuse is being perpetrated by someone the victim knows. See id.
256. See id. at 314 (addressing extreme paucity of empirical scientific research
on efficacy of sex offender registration and notification laws, particularly with re-
spect to community notification component).
257. See id. (stating that sex offenders can travel to neighboring communities,
where they are not known, to select victims).
258. See id. (noting that sex offenders subject to registration and notification
requirements of Megan's Laws could conceivably travel outside of notified commu-
nities to select victims).
In light of the many concerns regarding the efficacy of sex offender registra-
tion and notification laws, one commentator is arguing for the enactment of a
stronger version of Megan's Law. See Tom Bromwell, A Stronger Megan's Law, THE
WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 28, 1997, at C8 (discussing proposed legislative revisions
to Maryland's Megan's Law). Tom Bromwell, a Democratic state senator repre-
senting Baltimore County, stated that during the 1998 General Assembly session,
he will sponsor legislation to expand Maryland's Megan's Law. See id. Bromwell's
proposed expansion provides that sex offenders who are determined to present a
high risk for reoffending can be indefinitely confined in a mental health facility
after they have completed their prison sentence. See id. In support of his position,
Bromwell relies on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Kansas v. Hendricks. In
Hendricks, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Kansas legislation
providing for the post-sentence, involuntary civil commitment of sexually violent
predators after they have completed their prison sentences. See Kansas v. Hen-
dricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2086 (1997).
259. See Hacking, supra note 2, at 806 (noting need for Supreme Court ruling
on constitutionality of sex offender registration and notification laws); see also
Gibeaut, supra note 4, at 37 ("Given the importance of the issues and the deep rift
among the lower courts, it is a safe bet that the Supreme Court will take up the ex
post facto question."); Tony Mauro, High Court Tackles Big Issue This Term: Affirma-
tive Action, USA TODAY, Oct. 3, 1997, at IA (stating that Supreme Court may decide
to address constitutionality of federal Megan's Law in upcoming term).
During the writing of this Note, the attorney for E.B., Gerald R. Salerno, filed
a petition for a rehearing en banc in front of the United States Court of Appeals
[Vol. 43: p. 581
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in all fifty states and in the federal jurisdiction, it is crucial that the Court
determine whether community notification pursuant to sex offender legis-
lation imposes punishment in violation of the United States Constitution.
In view of the Third Circuit's improper constitutional analysis under the
Artway framework, the Court should unequivocally hold that community
notification pursuant to sex offender registration and notification laws is
unconstitutional.
David S. DeMatteo
for the Third Circuit. See Telephone Interview with Gerald R. Salerno, Counsel for
E.B. (Sept. 11, 1997). After the Third Circuit denied the petition for rehearing,
Mr. Salerno stated that he will seek review in the Supreme Court of the United
States. See E.B. v. Verniero, 127 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 1997) (denying petition for re-
hearing en banc); Telephone Interview with Gerald R. Salerno, Counsel for E.B.
(Nov. 5, 1997). Subsequently, the Supreme Court denied certiorari. See W.P. v.
Verniero, 118 S. Ct. 1039 (1998).
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